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ABSTRACT. In their seminal paper Grossman and Shapiro (1984) find that informative
advertising is socially excessive in an oligopoly (entry is also socially excessive). However,
the analysis assumed that all consumers receive at least one advertisement. Christou and
Vettas (2008), among others, present counter-examples in alternative settings, showing when
the assumption does not hold, the equilibrium advertising may, instead, be inefficiently low.
Christou and Vettas (2008) also show there may be non-existence due to discontinuities
from undercutting, that quasiconcavity may not hold, and present examples in which the
equilibrium does not exist as firms would deviate to a higher price. We revisit the question
by modeling firms (like consumers) as a continuum, which mitigates the discontinuity
that exists in both papers and allows the general analysis to include the cases when some
consumers receive no advertisements. As a result, we are able to derive explicit and intuitive
conditions for an equilibrium. More importantly, we find, instead, that advertising is socially
insufficient regardless of the fraction of the consumers who receive an ad, including when
all consumers receive at least one ad. We also find that there is insufficient entry instead of
excess entry. We provide intuition for the difference between our and previous results.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Advertising is ubiquitous in print, airwaves and digital media with over a half-trillion dol-
lars (about Belgium’s GDP) being spent globally on advertising each year (www.statista.com).
With advertising, a firm can persuade consumers to buy its product by communicating to
them its characteristics and prices. This also allows the firm to distinguish its product from
its competitors’ and to enter into new markets, including those in which consumers are
already aware of its rivals’ products.
Given the large expenditures on advertising, its potential informational role and its effect
on consumption decisions, determining the benefit these expenditures create for society
has been a focus of economist, policy makers and the public. Seminal, classic work by
Butters (1977) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984) introduced the modeling to investigate how
informative (truthful) advertising benefits society through demand creation in the former
–consumers learn of the existence of the market – andmatching effect in the latter –consumers
learn a product’s characteristics relative to rival products.1 Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
model the match effect by using the Salop (1979) circular-city model: transportation costs
represent society’s lost from poor product matches.
While society and firms incur the same cost from advertising, the benefits to society can
differ from the individual firm’s benefit even with truthful advertising. That is, the market
could have excessive or insufficient advertising from the social perspective.2 Society’s
benefit from the demand creation tends to be greater than the firm’s as a firm usually does
not capture the consumer’s entire benefit from learning about the product (i.e., consumer
surplus).3 However, the relationship between society’s benefit from the matching effect (the
consumer gets a product closer to their most preferred, which the firm does not internalize)
versus the firm’s benefit (it steals a sale from a rival, which has no benefit to society if costs
are identical –business stealing effect) is ambiguous (Bagwell, 2007) though in most models
including Salop (1979) the firm’s benefit exceeds society’s benefit.
A key result in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) is that for a given number of firms, advertis-
ing is socially excessive, though they note the demand creation effect is not present in their
model as they assume that the number of firms is sufficiently large4 in equilibrium so that all
consumers receive at least one ad.5 Thus, their analytical results turn only on whether the
business stealing effect is greater than the matching effect. However, in the appendix they
provide examples showing that with few firms in the market, advertising is still excessive.
Christou and Vettas (2008, Fn. 29), however, find that if there are few firms, numerical
examples show that the Grossman and Shapiro (1984) result “is not generally correct.” They
also show through examples that there can be insufficient advertising in a random utility
model and recall that Tirole (1988) had noted this possibility and demonstrated it in a
Hotelling model.
The main point of Christou and Vettas (2008), though, is that there may not be an
equilibrium in these models: “Quasi-concavity of profits may fail, as each firm may prefer
to deviate to a high price, targeting consumers who only become informed about its own
product.” Technically, Grossman and Shapiro (1984, Fn. 8) restrict the firm to prices below
this price arguing the restriction “amounts to putting an upper bound on 푣,” but they do not
explicitly derive a condition on 푣. Unfortunately, providing a condition for the existence of
the symmetric equilibrium in Christou and Vettas (2008) is not feasible. The main issue is
that profits are discontinuous in price: a firm may choose to deviate from the equilibrium to
1However, as these –and our– models assume unit demand and covered market, a third beneficial “quantity-
demand effect” resulting from the lower prices induced by advertising does not exist in these models.
2Given the assumption in all of these (and our) models of unit demand and “covered market,” i.e., all consumers
are served in equilibrium, the market price is irrelevant to the social optimum.
3Shapiro (1980) shows that a monopolist under-advertises for this reason.
4Grossman and Shapiro (1984, Fn. 10) “The approximation is most accurate for 푛 large."
5E.g., the demand function Grossman and Shapiro (1984, eq. 7) assumes all consumers receive at least one ad.
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a lower price to not only capture the customers between the firm and its nearest neighbor
but also its next nearest neighbors –the supercompetitive price in Salop (1979), leading to a
discrete increase in demand. To avoid this possibility Grossman and Shapiro (1984) restrict
their analysis to prices greater than the Salop supercompetitive price.6
We return to the question of informative advertising in an oligopoly, but with a different
approach to resolve the problems with discontinuity, allow for the demand creation effect,
and obtain existence conditions so that the equilibrium can be fully characterized without
an approximation. We do this by also using the Salop (1979) model but take Grossman
and Shapiro (1984) assumption that the number of firms is “large” to the limit: we assume
a continuum of firms just as Butters (1977) implicitly assumes,7 which also mirrors the
assumption on consumers. This assumption could also be viewed as merging of the two
classic models.8 A priori the assumption would not appear to change the underlying market
mechanisms, and indeed our equilibrium price and profits expressions are consistent with
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and have all the same comparative static.9 With this assump-
tion there is no price decrease that creates a discrete increase in demand and as a result we
can achieve our goals. Finally, this assumption allows us to focus on the effect entry has on
advertising without conflating entry’s (welfare beneficial) effect on reducing transportation
costs as with a continuum entry solely increases the mass of firms.10
The first gain from our approach is that we derive explicit conditions for the existence
of a unique symmetric equilibrium. This is not just a technical curiosity as the conditions
give insights as to when there will be a monopolistically competitive equilibrium, which are
missing from the previous work. Specifically, there are two conditions, and they ensure that
a firm does not have an incentive to deviate to the monopoly price. The first (18) is that the
consumer that a firm reaches is sufficiently likely to receive an advertisement from another
firm (about a half chance): if this condition did not hold a firm is unlikely to face competition,
and so would want to set instead a higher price. This condition effectively requires that
marginal advertising costs are low relative to transport costs. The second condition (19) is
that the monopoly price (or more precisely, the consumers’ potential reservation value 푣)
cannot be too much greater than the competitive price: even if a firm faces a good chance of
having at least one rival, if the equilibrium price is too close to marginal cost (and thus earns
effectively zero), then the monopoly price is attractive even if it unlikely to succeed. For
this reason, the second condition is that the monopoly price cannot be too much greater than
the equilibrium price interacting with the probability that a firm is in a monopoly position.
To provide more details to the second condition, recall that in Hotelling/Salop type
models there is a disconnect between the competitive price and the monopoly price, as the
former depends on transportation costs and the number of rival firms, but is independent of
the consumers’ reservation value. Thus, the second condition requires an upper bound on
consumers’ potential reservation value 푣 relative to transportation costs: a greater 푡 both
lowers the monopoly price (푣 − 푡2 ) and raises the monopolistically competitive price, thedirect effect from transportation costs. The need for an upper bound is noted in Grossman
and Shapiro (1984, Fn. 8), but not derived. The second condition also depends on trans-
portation and advertising costs through their effect on aggregate advertising, but aggregate
advertising has are two opposing effects. On one hand, as aggregate advertising increases
6Specifically, given rivals all setting 푝 Grossman and Shapiro (1984, Fn 8) assume that the firm would choose
a 푝 ∈
(
푝 − 푡푛 , 푝 +
푡
푛
)
. This restriction may have additional importance as, e.g., in their base case simulation, it
would seem a deviation to the supercompetitive price is more profitable than their equilibrium price. Thus, letting
firms set the supercompetitive price may well change the analysis.
7Butters (1977) assumes the number of firms approaches infinity so that the Poisson distribution can be used to
approximate the probability that any given consumer receives an ad.
8Though we do not study this, in the limit, as transportation costs go to zero (푡 → 0), the model becomes the
Butters (1977) model.
9Not all comparative statics in Christou and Vettas (2008) are the same as in Grossman and Shapiro (1984).
10In Grossman and Shapiro (1984), entry reduces aggregate transportation costs directly.
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the monopolistically competitive price decreases and so deviating to the monopoly price
appears more attractive. On the other hand, as aggregate advertising increases, the probabil-
ity of being ex post a monopolist decreases and so deviating to the monopoly price is less
attractive. As a result, the relationship between aggregate advertising and the upper bound
on the consumers’ reservation value is non-monotonic. For very low levels of aggregate
advertising, an increase in aggregate advertising causes the upper-bound on consumers’
reservation value to decrease (so that the monopoly price is lower and less attractive relative
to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium). However, beyond a point, as aggregate
advertising increases, the probability of the firm ever being in the monopoly position goes
to zero, and the largest monopoly price compatible with equilibrium also increases.
These opposing effects appear with changes in advertising costs. As advertising costs
increase, aggregate advertising decreases (a firm is more likely in a monopoly position),
but the equilibrium price increases (monopoly price is less attractive). As a result, there is
a non-monotonicity: starting at low costs, the former dominates and so the condition for
an equilibrium tightens as advertising costs increase. As they increase further, the latter
can dominate, thereby relaxing the condition. In an example reported in Section 7, with a
specific cost function, for some values of 푣 there is an equilibrium for low advertising costs,
but as advertising costs increase, the equilibrium no longer exists, but as costs increase even
further the equilibrium exists again, and finally if it increases even further an equilibrium no
longer exists (because of the first condition).
The second condition, an upper bound on consumers’ potential reservation value, is inter-
esting for another reason as it points to the conflict between the covered market assumption
and the monopolistically competitive equilibrium. Specifically, as in Grossman and Shapiro
(1984, Fn. 9), we make the standard covered market assumption: the consumers’ potential
reservation value 푣 is sufficiently large that all consumers that receive an advertisement, will
chose to buy. However, our condition (and in Grossman and Shapiro (1984, Fn. 8)) shows
that 푣 cannot be too large relative to advertising and transportation cost, or else the firm
will deviate to the higher monopoly price. These two restrictions could in principle rule
out existence of an equilibrium, both here and possibly in Grossman and Shapiro (1984);
however, values of 푣 compatible with equilibrium existence always exists in our model.
Another gain from our approach is that we can have monopolistically competitive equi-
libria in which a large fraction of consumers receives no advertisements, while Grossman
and Shapiro (1984) results are derived under the assumption that all consumers receive at
least one ad. Further, while they do provide examples that have a small number of firms (푛),
it is still true that the probability that every consumer receives at least one ad is roughly 1.
E.g., for the benchmark case, the probability is 0.9999. The lowest probability in any of the
examples is 0.9945. As discussed above, several have noted that if some consumers receive
no advertisements, advertising can be socially insufficient. We confirm this in our setting.
However, we find an even stronger result: that advertising is socially insufficient even if
all consumers receive an ad, and that therefore advertising is always socially insufficient
(Proposition 4). Moreover, since in our model, as with the previous models, there is no
individual “quantity demand effect” from the lower price that increased advertising induces
(all the models have unit demand), our model may underestimate the social benefit from
truthful advertising and how much advertising is socially under-provided in the market.
The intuition for our result is as follows. When aggregate advertising is low, and each
customer is unlikely to receivemultiple advertisements, there is a substantial demand creation
effect. In this case, as the firm does not capture all the surplus, its private return is less
than the social return, a well-known effect. As aggregate advertising increases, it becomes
more likely that a consumer which the firm reaches also receives other advertisements. The
gain to society becomes smaller as it is more about a better match (saving in transportation
costs), than demand creation, but the equilibrium price decreases so the firm’s gain is also
smaller. However, a key difference between a full information environment such as, e.g.,
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Salop (1979) and the environment in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) or in the present paper
is that “competition is no longer localized” (Grossman and Shapiro, 1984, p. 76); the firm
potentially competes for all consumers, including those the furthest away from it, who
may have an offer from a firm that has a product very close to that consumer’s ideal. In
contrast, with compete information the firm only competes for consumers that are immediate
neighbors. Thus, with incomplete information there is downward pressure on the price
as it induces the furthest consumer to buy while the price need not do this with complete
information. So, the firm’s return is smaller. On the other hand, society cares about the
expected savings in transportation costs. Thus, the gain from the business stealing effect is
smaller than in the Salop model and society’s gain: there is too little advertising.
As to the differences between our results and the results of Grossman and Shapiro (1984),
recall that Christou and Vettas (2008, Fn. 29) find examples in which when the demand
creation effect is strong there is insufficient advertising in the Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
model. Secondly, the approximation on which the analysis of Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
rely does more than just eliminate the demand creation effect; Equation (6) in Grossman and
Shapiro (1984) overstates themarginal revenue (quantity sold) from an increase in advertising
and so overstates the equilibrium level of advertising. The approximation also underestimates
the welfare benefit from the matching effect unless the number of firms and/or the fraction
of consumers reached are small – which is ruled out by their approximation. Further, the
approximation effectively requires that consumers receive advertisements from at least two
firms, which of course implies a large chance the consumer receives an advertisement from
more than two firms.11 Since the consumer is likely to receive several advertisements, the
welfare gain from the expected reduction in transportation costs from another advertisement
is reduced. Thirdly, as Butters (1977) with effectively a continuum of firms finds advertising
to be socially optimal with homogeneous goods, the divergence in results would not seem to
turn on the assumption of a continuum of firms. Fourthly, in the Salop (1979) model with
a discrete number of firms, there is an “excessive entry” effect as the private return from
entry exceeds the social benefit from the reduction in transportation cost, and this may be
driving the excess advertising. Without the demand creation effect, the marginal increase in
advertising can be thought of as “entering” a new Salop market that already has firms in it
(i.e., to the consumer reached, the other firms that have reached them) in which we know the
incentives to enter are excessive. Thus, one advantage of our approach is that while there is
“business stealing” – one firm’s sale may come at the expense of another – there is not the
effect that induces excess entry with the Salop model, which may muddle the analysis of the
direct effect of advertising.
We also consider how social and private returns differ as the product become more
differentiated. Christou and Vettas (2008) provide examples with a fixed number of firms
in which advertising can be either insufficient of excessive, from a social point of view,
depending on whether the support of the consumers’ valuation is small or large, namely
depending on whether product differentiation is weak or strong. In our model, we find
too that, for fixed number of firms, as transport cost increase the private value increases
relative to the social value because the equilibrium price increases. However, this points to
why having the equilibrium conditions is important: while for large enough 푡 the private
value of advertising would exceed the social value if it were a monopolistically competitive
equilibrium, with such a large 푡 a monopolistically competitive equilibrium does not exist.
We then endogenize entry and again find that our comparative statics are in line with
Grossman and Shapiro (1984).12 In particular, we find, as they do, that an increase in the
11Specifically, equation (6) in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) has a term (1 − 휙)푛−1 that is set to zero as
well as a term (1 − 휙)푛. The probability that a consumer receives advertisements from at least two firms is
1 − (1 − 휙)푛 − 푛 (1 − 휙)푛−1. Even in their simulations, the probability of receiving advertisements from at least
four firms is high. For example, in the benchmark case it is 0.96 with 푛 = 14.
12Because of intractability, the entry equilibrium cannot be characterized in Christou and Vettas (2008).
4
cost of advertising could induce entry as it increases profits for given number of firms. We
provide an alternative condition for this: a proportional increase in marginal cost does this
(for example, an ad-valorem tax based on marginal costs). We present an example showing
that with quadratic cost of advertising (in which case, an increase in the coefficient of
marginal cost causes a proportionate increase in marginal cost), that equilibrium profits for
a fixed number of firms increases. The intuition is that advertising is a prisoner’s dilemma
–the cooperative solution has less advertising– so increases in the cost of only the last units
of advertising can increase profits by inducing the cooperative solution of less advertising.
Finally we show that socially there is too little entry: the planner would have more firms
enter the market while in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) the planner would reduce entry. This
result occurs despite our model not having the social benefit of entry reducing transportation
cost as it does in Grossman and Shapiro (1984). The reason for the difference may partly
turn on the earlier discussion regarding localized competition, but also on that in the Salop
model there is inherently excessive entry. In contrast with a continuum Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) find there can be too much or too little entry. Thus, Grossman and Shapiro’s analysis
of entry may be combining the effects of advertising (the question at hand) with the effect
of strategic competition and the direct effect of transportation cost. Intuitively, since our
model does not have the excess entry effect nor a direct effect on transportation costs, entry
is solely a question of its effect on advertising (which has an indirect effect on transportation
costs). As we had already seen that for fixed number of firms there is too little advertising,
then that there is too little entry is no longer surprising. In some sense the planner’s problem
is to choose the level of aggregate advertising while minimizing cost through the choice of
entry and advertising levels.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
and Section 3 characterizes the conditions guaranteeing surplus maximization. Sections 4, 5
and 6 characterize the sellers’ pricing, advertising and entry equilibrium decisions. Section
7 presents an example that highlights some important points, with particular reference to
the case of free entry, and Section 8 contains some concluding remarks. The proofs of the
main results are in Appendix A; the results related to the model’s comparative statics, along
with the respective proofs, are in Appendix B.
2. THE MODEL
We model preferences and production as in the standard Grossman and Shapiro (1984);
Salop (1979) setting, with a unit continuum of buyers, endowed with a preference parameter
that is uniformly distributed around a circle with unit circumference. Each buyer demands
at most one unit of one of the products. The distance between any two arbitrary addresses 푥
and 푠 in [0, 1) is defined as
푑(푠, 푥) = min{|푠 − 푥|, 1 − |푠 − 푥|}, (1)
where |.| is the absolute value operator. A buyer with preference parameter (or “address”) 푥
who purchases and consumes the product of seller 푠 at the price 푝푠 receives utility
푢(푥, 푠) = 푣 − 푡 푑(푠, 푥) − 푝푠,
where 푣 ∈ ℝ++ and 푡 ∈ ℝ++ respectively express the payoff from consumption of the “ideal”product and the pace at which the payoff decreases as 푑(푠, 푥) increases. To dispense with
tedious qualifications related to possible corner solutions, we follow Grossman and Shapiro
(1984)13 and make the standard “covered market” assumption, expressed in this case by
푡 < 푣. Under this assumption, each buyer would be willing to pay the monopoly price 푣 − 푡2even for her least preferred product.
There is also a set Σ of potential, ex-ante identical sellers. By default, all sellers are
inactive. Each seller who decides to be active chooses an arbitrary address in the circle and
13See Grossman and Shapiro (1984, Fn. 9).
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produce as many units of the product as she wishes, upon demand, at the constant unit cost
of 0. The buyers who do not purchase a product and the sellers who remain inactive realize a
payoff equal to 0. The size of the set of the sellers who choose to be active is denoted by 푚.
The buyers may in principle know about the existence of the sellers and the products, but
they are only able to purchase the products - if any - for which they receive advertisements
from the respective sellers, The advertisements truthfully inform the buyers about the
characteristics and price of the products, and the number of advertisements delivered by
each seller is drawn from a Poisson distribution with parameter 훼 ∈ ℝ+, whose value ischosen by the seller and coincides with the expected number of advertisements delivered.
In connection with the delivery process, we can envisage our circle as a projection
of a vertical cylinder with unit height, with the buyers uniformly distributed on its side
surface and each vertical line identifying buyers with identical preferences. The identities
of the buyers who receive the advertisements are then randomly drawn from the uniform
distribution on the cylinder’s side-surface. The draws are thus independent, both for each
seller and across sellers; the addresses of the potential trading partners faced by each seller
are uniformly distributed around the circle, and the probability of multiple advertisements
delivered by a seller to any given buyer is equal to 0.
The advertising cost faced by each seller is linked to the intensity variable 훼 by the
function 푐 ∶ ℝ+ → ℝ, which is at least twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictlyconvex over (0,∞). We conveniently denote the first and the second derivative of 푐(훼) by
푐′(훼) and by 푐′′(훼). We assume that 푐′(훼) grows without bounds as 훼 increases, namely
lim훼→∞{푐′(훼)} = ∞, and that the limit lim훼→0{푐(훼)}, denoted by 퐹 , is strictly positive.We also identify the choice of 훼 = 0 with the decision to remain inactive, and set 푐(0) = 0,
i.e. we effectively assume that each seller will only bear the fixed cost if her advertising
intensity is positive with no loss of generality. Our assumptions imply
lim
훼→0
{
푐(훼)
훼
}
= lim
훼→∞
{
푐(훼)
훼
}
= ∞, (2)
and guarantee existence of a unique positive advertising intensity 훼, featuring equality
between the average cost
푐 ≡ 푐
(
훼
)
훼
(3)
and the marginal cost corresponding to it, which minimizes the cost per unit of advertising
intensity.14
We also assume a relatively efficient advertising technology, in the sense that(
푣 − 푡
4
)
훼 − 푐
(
훼
)
> 0. (4)
This assumption guarantees that a set of active sellers with positive measure choosing the
most efficient level of advertising intensity can generate a surplus, net of the advertising
cost. Given (3) and convexity of 푐(훼), (4) guarantees that(
푣 − 푡
4
)
훼 − 푐′(훼) > 0. (5)
14Existence of 훼 follows from continuity of 푐(훼)훼 overℝ++ and (2). As to uniqueness, if (3) holds both if 훼 = 훼′and if 훼 = 훼′′, then strict convexity of 푐(훼) over (0,∞) implies that for any 휆 ∈ (0, 1) we must have
푐
(
휆 훼′ + (1 − 휆) 훼′′
) ≤ 휆 푐 (훼′) + (1 − 휆) 푐 (훼′′)
= 휆 훼′ 푐 + (1 − 휆) 훼′′ 푐
=
(
휆 훼′ + (1 − 휆) 훼′′
)
푐.
If 훼′ ≠ 훼′′, the inequality would be strict, and the choice of any advertising level 휆 훼′ + (1 − 휆) 훼′′ would be
associated with an average cost lower than the minimum cost 푐. Hence, 훼′ must be equal to 훼′′.
Convexity of 푐(훼) is not sufficient to guarantee existence of a cost-minimizing scale of advertising. For example,
a cost-minimizing scale does not exist if 푐(훼) = 푘 + 훼 + 1훼+1 , for any 푘 ∈ ℝ++.
6
holds for values of 훼 in a right-neighborhood of 0 essentially, a positive margin over the
variable cost at low scales of production is required to cover the fixed cost.
Trade takes place subject to mutual agreement. The timing is as follows:
(1) The sellers choose their advertising intensity 훼 - and thus also choose whether to
be active, or not, respectively if they set 훼 > 0 or 훼 = 0. Each active seller also
chooses her address 푠 ∈ [0, 1).
(2) The sellers set their prices.
(3) Consumers receive the sellers’ advertisements, and decide whether to purchase
one of the products for which they received an offer - if any - or to exit the market
without purchasing any product.
Decisions made within each stage are simultaneous.
All agents are risk-neutral, and maximize their expected payoffs. We focus on pure
strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (“PBEs”), in which the sellers are uniformly distributed
around the circle,15 and all active sellers choose identical advertising intensities and prices.
As we show in Proposition 1, in Section 3, the uniform distribution of the sellers is a necessary
condition for surplus maximization. Definition 1 provides the operational definition of
equilibrium.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is:
(1) An acceptance strategy, used by all buyers, such that a buyer with address 푥 who
receives offers from a (finite) set of sellers 푆 accepts the offer of an arbitrary seller
in the set
푆′ ≡ {푠′ ∈ 푆|푣 − 푡 ||푠′ − 푥|| − 푝퐸 ≥ 0 and for each 푠 ∈ 푆,
푣 − 푡 ||푠′ − 푥|| − 푝퐸 ≥ 푣 − 푡 |푠 − 푥| − 푝퐸} ,
including those among the sellers in 푆 whose offers yield the largest positive net
surplus, and to forgo purchasing a product if 푆′ is empty, namely if she does not
receive any offers that would leave her with a positive net surplus.
(2a) In the case of a given mass of active sellers - A profit maximizing ordered triple(
훼푠, 푖푠, 푝푠
)
∈
(
ℝ+ × [0, 1) × ℝ+
)
, for each seller 푠 ∈ Σ, such that 훼푠 > 0 and 푝푠
are identical across sellers, the choices of 푖푠 make the sellers’ population uniformly
distributed over [0, 1), and each seller realizes a non-negative profit.
(2b) In the case of free entry - The same requirements as in (2a), for the active sellers,
augmented with the requirement that the mass of the active sellers 푚 makes the
maximized expected profit equal to 0, and each seller is therefore indifferent between
being active or inactive.
In the case of a given number of active sellers, we effectively assume that the size of the
sellers’ population Σ is sufficiently small that all sellers can realize a non-negative profit if
they choose to be active. The analysis of free entry covers the cases in which, by contrast, Σ
is sufficiently large that the expected profit for the active sellers is equal to 0, and the sellers
are therefore indifferent between being active or inactive.
In our analysis, we generally focus on the strategies of the active sellers. The identical
choices of the advertising intensity and the price of the active sellers and their uniform
distribution allow us to consider a simplified representation of their strategies, namely the
ordered pair (훼, 푝), where 훼 > 0.
3. SURPLUS MAXIMIZATION
We first consider the problem of assigning to each address an advertising intensity
and a set of active sellers to maximize the expected surplus generated by the exchanges.
The assignments are expressed by two measurable functions 휌 ∶ [0, 1) → ℝ[0,1)+ and
15This is also assumed in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and equivalently in Christou and Vettas (2008).
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휇 ∶ [0, 1) → ℝ[0,1)+ . We denote by 휙휌(푥, 푦) the density function of the event that the closestseller from whom a buyer at 푥 receives an advertisement - the one whose product the buyer
should consume, if any - is at a distance 푦 from her; we assume that 휙휌 has the extended
set
[
0, 12
]
∪
{
푣
푡
}
as its support, and has a mass of 1 − 휙휌
(
푥, 12
)
at 푦 = 푣푡 , corresponding
to a utility level of 0. By convexity of 푐(훼) and Jensen’s inequality, the sellers operating at
any address 푥 should choose the same advertising intensity 휌푥휇푥 - hypothetical differencesbetween the aggregate intensities at different points should only be matched by a suitable
distribution of the sellers. We can then directly write the objective function as
푊 (휌, 휇) = ∫
1
0
(
∫
1
2
0
휙휌(푥, 푦) (푣 − 푡 푦) 푑푦 − 휇푥 푐
(
휌푥
휇푥
))
푑푥, (6)
with the convention that 푐
(
휌푥
휇푥
)
= 0 holds if 휇푥 = 0.
Proposition 1 provides necessary conditions for surplus maximization, along with a
refined expression for the total surplus.
Proposition 1. If the distribution of the sellers over the circle is a choice variable, then
surplus maximization is guaranteed if the following conditions are both verified.
I. For any given mass of active sellers 푚, (i) the sellers are uniformly distributed
around the circle, and (ii) (almost) all sellers choose an identical advertising
intensity.
II. The first- and second-order conditions for maximization of
푤(훼, 푚) = ∫
1
2
0
2 훼 푚푒−2 훼 푚푥 (푣 − 푡푥) 푑푥 − 푚푐(훼)
= (1 − 푒−훼 푚) 푣 + ((훼 푚 + 1) 푒
−훼 푚 − 1) 푡
2 훼 푚
− 푚푐(훼), (7)
w.r.t. the choice variable(s) - 훼 and possibly 푚 - are verified.
Proposition 2 characterizes the solution to the surplus maximization problem if the social
planner can choose both 푚 and 훼, and if the planner only chooses the advertising intensity
for each seller, taking the number of the active sellers as given.16 In both cases, considering
Proposition 1, we focus directly on cases featuring a uniform distribution of the sellers.
Proposition 2.
I. In the solution of the surplus maximization problem
max
(훼,푚)∈ℝ2+
{푤(훼, 푚)}, (8)
the mass of the active sellers is equal to 푚푤, defined as the value of 푚 that solves
푒−훼 푚
(
푣 +
푡
(
푒훼 푚 − 훼2 푚2 − 훼 푚 − 1
)
2 훼 푚2
)
− 푐
(
훼
)
= 0, (9)
and (almost) all active sellers choose an advertising intensity equal to 훼.
II. In the solution of the surplus maximization problem
max
훼∈ℝ
{푤(훼, 푚)}, (10)
16Grossman and Shapiro (1984) obtain a similar condition: the weighted marginal cost must be equal to the
average cost. In the limit as each firm’s market share goes to zero - as is always the case here - the two conditions
are identical.
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for a given mass 푚 > 0 of active sellers, almost all sellers choose an advertising
intensity 훼푚, defined as the value of 훼 that solves
푒−훼 푚
(
푣푚 +
푡
(
푒훼 푚 − 푎2 푚2 − 훼 푚 − 1
)
2 훼2 푚
)
− 푚푐′(훼) = 0. (11)
훼푚 is increasing in 푣 and is either increasing or decreasing in 푡, depending re-
spectively on whether 훼푚 is smaller or greater than the value of 훼 that solves
푒훼 푚 − 푎2 푚2 − 훼 푚 − 1 = 0; this equation is verified if 훼 푚 ≈ 1.79, which corre-
sponds to a probability of approximately 16 that any given consumer receives no
advertisements.
Essentially, if the planner can choose both 훼 and 푚, 훼 is set at the level that minimizes
the unit cost of advertising intensity, and the number of the sellers is chosen based on the
first- and second-order conditions; in the case of an optimum conditional on a given value
of 푚, the advertising intensity of each seller is chosen based on the first- and second-order
conditions. In the latter case, the optimal advertising intensity may be smaller or greater
than 훼, depending respectively on whether 푚 is greater or smaller than 푚푤.The result that 훼푚 increases with 푣 follows directly from the greater expected payoff fromeach advertisement delivered. As to the response of 훼푚 to changes in 푡, there are two effects:An increase in 푡 reduces the expected value of the exchanges induced by a given advertising
intensity, because the distance between a buyer and a seller is positive with probability
1; however, it also increases the gain from a greater advertising intensity, by potentially
allowing each buyer to locate a closer seller. As a result of this tension, the response of the
advertising intensity to changes in the transportation cost 푡 depends on the initial level of
aggregate advertising. For very low levels, the consumers are unlikely to receive multiple
advertisements; hence, advertising largely translates into “demand creation”, and welfare
is decreasing in transport costs. However, as aggregate advertising increases, the chances
of a consumer receiving a second advertisement increases and so the better match reduces
transportation cost.
The turning point corresponds to a probability of about 16 that any given consumerreceives no advertisements (at approximately 훼 푚 = 1.79). The key is whether the marginal
advertisement is likely to be demand creating (so larger 푡 means greater cost/less value from
demand creation), or match enhancing (so larger 푡 means greater cost saving from better
match). This turned on whether the probability a consumer received an advertisement was
less or greater than 16 (훼 푚 is less or greater than approximately 1.79). So, for example,holding 푚 constant, if advertising becomes costlier so that the optimal 훼 decreases lowering
optimal aggregate advertising below 1.79, the marginal welfare benefit goes from increasing
in 푡 to decreasing in 푡. Then, an increase in 푡 reduces the optimal advertising intensity 훼
further.
4. THE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE PRICING GAME
In this Section, we establish existence of an equilibrium with symmetric prices of the
game played in a scenario in which all sellers choose the same advertising intensity 훼̂. We
focus on a “reference seller” with address 0 - with no loss of generality, given symmetry
- and assume that the seller’s competitors all chose the same price 푝̂. The optimal pricing
strategy is independent of the seller’s own advertising intensity 훼, as far as it is positive (any
price would trivially be an optimal price if 훼 = 0).
We denote by
푝푀 ≡ 푣 − 푡2 . (12)
the price set by a hypothetical monopolist, under our assumption that 푣 is sufficiently large
that every buyer is potentially willing to purchase the seller’s product, regardless of her
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address. We also introduce two further prices to which we repeatedly refer:
푝 ≡ 푝̂ − 푡
2
, (13)
푝 ≡ 푝̂ + 푡
2
. (14)
If we disregard the possibility of values of 푝 and 푝 greater than the monopoly price 푝푀 , 푝
is the greatest price such that all buyers - except possibly the buyer with address 12 , facedwith an offer for her ideal product - would prefer the offer of our reference seller to that of
any other seller. By contrast, 푝 (≤ 푝푀) is the lowest price such that an offer would only bepossibly accepted by the buyers who receive no other offers - labeled captive buyers.
In Lemma 1, we establish that the price chosen by the reference seller must be strictly
positive and is also subject to a further, possibly tighter lower bound.
Lemma 1. The price that maximizes the expected profit of a seller whose competitors choose
the advertising intensity 훼̂ and the price 푝̂ is strictly positive, and is no smaller than 푝 in
(13).
The results in Lemma 1 essentially follow from the fact that each buyer is a captive buyer
with a positive probability, and from the inelastic demand faced by the seller for prices lower
than 푝.
It is readily verified that the buyers with address 훽 > 푣−푝푡 , where 푝 is the price of thereference seller, would not be willing to purchase the seller’s product, regardless of whether
or not they receive other offers. If 푝 ≥ 푣, then the set of the buyers who do purchase the
seller’s product has measure 0, and we can further restrict attention to prices strictly lower
than 푣. Let us then consider any buyer with address 훽 ∈
[
0, 푣−푝푡
]
- and thus focus on one
of the two semi-circles delimited by the address of the reference seller and by its antipodal
address, to fix ideas - and set
푥퐿훽
(
푝, 푝̂
)
= 푝̂ − 푝
푡
,
푥푅훽
(
푝, 푝̂
)
= 2 훽 − 푝̂ − 푝
푡
.
If 푝 ≤ 푝̂, then a buyer would accept an offer from the reference seller if she received no
offers from sellers with addresses in the set
푇 −훽
(
푝, 푝̂
)
=
{
∅, if 훽 < 푝̂−푝푡 ,(
푥퐿훽
(
푝, 푝̂
)
, 푥푅훽
(
푝, 푝̂
))
, if 훽 ≥ 푝̂−푝푡 . (15a)
Basically, if the reference seller charges a price lower than that of her competitors, the buyers
with higher valuations for her product would choose her offer regardless of what other offers,
if any, they receive (first line of (15a)). For values of 푝 greater than p, some buyers would
rather purchase the products of sellers closer to them, the price differential notwithstanding
(second line of (15a)); the number of these sellers increases with the buyer’s distance from
the reference seller. In the case of buyers with addresses in 훽 ∈ ( 12 , 1), the values of thevariables corresponding to 푥퐿훽 and 푥푅훽 are the same as those in (15a), except for the sign.Similar remarks apply in the case of (15b) below. Notice that because the probability of
an offer from a seller with any given address is equal to 0, we consider open intervals of
addresses with no consequence on the results.
If 푝 ≥ 푝̂, then a buyer with address 훽 would accept the offer of our reference seller if she
received no offers from sellers with addresses in the set
푇 +훽
(
푝, 푝̂
)
=
{(
푥퐿훽
(
푝, 푝̂
)
, 푥푅훽
(
푝, 푝̂
))
, if 훽 ≤ 12 − 푝−푝̂푡 ,
[0, 1), if 훽 > 12 − 푝−푝̂푡 .
(15b)
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(A) The case of 푝 < 푝̂. (B) The case of 푝 = 푝̂.
(C) The case of 푝 > 푝̂. (D) Probability of trade
as a function of the
distance between the
seller and the buyer.
FIGURE 1. Parts 1a, 1b and 1c illustrate the sets of the addresses of the
sellers whose products, offered at 푝̂, would be preferred to the product of
a seller located at the top of the circle. Part 1d illustrates the probability
of trade as a function of the distance between the seller and the buyer, in
an example with 훼 = 2, 푚 = 1 and 푡 = 1.
The interval in first line of (15b) is identical to that in the second line of (15a). In the case
of the second line of (15b), only the captive buyers would accept an offer from the reference
seller, given the distance and the high price of the product.
Figures 1a, 1b and 1c illustrate the different possible scenarios. Unless the interval with
the potentially preferred sellers engulfs the whole circle, its boundaries are symmetric around
the buyer’s address. If 푝 = 푝̂, then the length of the interval is equal to twice the distance
between the buyer and the reference seller. If 푝 < 푝̂, the interval is shorter, and its length is
equal to 0 for buyers suitably close to the seller; conversely, if 푝 > 푝̂, the interval is generally
longer, and fully covers circle in the case of buyers far away from the seller.
The probability 푞푦 that our reference buyer will receive no offers from sellers in an interval
(−푦, 0] or [0, 푦), where 푦 ∈
[
0, 12
)
, obeys the differential equation
푑푞푦
푑푦
= −훼 푚 푞푦.
By integrating both sides of the equation and using the boundary condition 푞0 = 1, we canimmediately establish that the complementary event of receiving advertisements from one
or more sellers at a distance smaller than 푦 is exponentially distributed, with parameter 훼 푚.
By using (15), we can then write the “twin” demand functions if 푝̂ < 푝푀 and 푝 ∈
(
푝, 푝
)
- so that the reference seller can potentially sell her product even to the antipodal buyers who
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do not receive better offers - as:
퐷−
(
훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂
)
= 2훼
(
∫
푝̂−푝
푡
0
푑훽 + ∫
1
2
푝̂−푝
푡
exp
(
−2훼̂ 푚
(
훽 − 푝̂ − 푝
푡
))
푑훽
)
= 훼
(
2
푡
(
푝̂ − 푝
)
+ 1
훼̂ 푚
(
1 − exp
(
2 훼̂ 푚
푡
(
푝̂ − 푝
)
− 훼̂ 푚
)))
, (16a)
if 푝 ∈ [푝, 푝̂) and 푝 > 0, and as
퐷+
(
훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂
)
= 2훼
(
∫
1
2−
푝−푝̂
푡
0
exp
(
−2훼̂ 푚
(
훽 − 푝̂ − 푝
푡
))
푑훽 + ∫
1
2
1
2−
푝−푝̂
푡
exp
(
−훼̂ 푚
)
푑훽
)
= 훼
(
1
훼̂ 푚
(
푒
2 훼̂ 푚
푡 (푝̂−푝) − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
+ 2푒
−훼̂ 푚
푡
(
푝 − 푝̂
))
. (16b)
if 푝 ∈ [푝̂,min{푝, 푝푀}].
The reason why we include 푝̂ in the domains of both 퐷− (훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂) and 퐷+ (훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂)
- similarly to what we do in the case of the profit equations (17) below - is that we ultimately
want to obtain a candidate optimal, interior price that coincides with 푝̂, when we investigate
existence of a symmetric equilibrium. Figure 1d can help us to interpret the expressions for
the probability of acceptance of an advertisement as a function of the distance between the
seller and the buyer, used in the integrands of (16a) and in (16b). The blue, the orange and
the green curve are referred to the cases of 푝 > 푝̂, 푝 = 푝̂ and 푝 < 푝̂. The expression for the
expected profit of our reference seller at an interior equilibrium is then
휋
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂
)
=
{
휋−
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂
)
, if 푝 ∈ [푝, 푝̂) and 푝 > 0,
휋+
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂
)
, if 푝 ∈ [푝̂,min{푝, 푝푀}] .
where
휋−
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂
)
= 푝퐷−
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂
)
, (17a)
휋+
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂
)
= 푝퐷+
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂
)
, (17b)
and the problem correspondingly faced by our reference seller is
max
푝∈ℝ
{
휋
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂
)}
,
where 훼, 훼̂, 푚 and 푝̂ are all taken as given in the pricing game.
Lemma 2 establishes that the optimal price set by a seller responding to the choice of 푝̂
by her competitors is also bounded above by the monopoly price 푝푀 .
Lemma 2. A seller who were forced to choose a price no smaller than min{푝, 푝푀}, if all
other sellers choose an advertising intensity 훼̂ and a price 푝̂ < 푝푀 , would maximize her
profit by choosing the monopoly price 푝푀 .
Lemma 2 allows us to conclude that a symmetric equilibrium price can be equal either to
푝푀 , or to a price strictly lower than 푝푀 . It also justifies both the assumption of prices nogreater than the monopoly price, and therefore the procedure used to derive (15), (16) and
(17).
We are now ready to characterize the symmetric price equilibrium, in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. If
훼̂ 푚 > log(2) (18)
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and 푣 ≤ ◦푣, where17
◦푣 = 푡
2
(
1 +
exp
(
훼̂ 푚
)
− 1
훼̂2 푚2
)
, (19)
then the symmetric equilibrium price and profit gross of advertising costs are
◦푝
(
훼̂, 푚
)
= 푡
2 훼̂ 푚
, (20)
◦휋
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚
)
= 훼 푡
2훼̂2 푚2
(
1 − exp
(
−훼̂ 푚
))
. (21)
Condition (18) is perhaps more easily interpreted as the probability a given consumer
receives an advertisement is no smaller than 푒−2 log(2)2 = 12 . The optimal price (20) isequivalent to the price in (11a) in Grossman and Shapiro (1984). As in Salop (1979);
Grossman and Shapiro (1984)), the monopolistically competitive price does not increase
with 푣, albeit the monopoly price does.
The two conditions for a monopolistically competitive equilibrium (18) and (19) rule
out deviating to the monopoly price as a best response. (18) ensures a sufficiently large
probability that any customer receives multiple advertisements, and thereby a sufficiently
intense level of competition. (19) guarantees that the largest valuation 푣 and therefore the
monopoly price is not too much greater than the equilibrium price, and features two opposite
effects. Increases in advertising do in fact translate into more intense competition, and
thereby cause the equilibrium price to decrease; however, they also make it less likely that
a consumer reached by a firm is not reached by any other firm, and will thus be a captive
customer. The former and the latter effect respectively make deviating to the monopoly
price more and less attractive for the firms. As it turns out, the largest value of 푣 compatible
with an interior equilibrium in (19) is decreasing and increasing in aggregate advertising
훼 푚, depending respectively on whether 훼 푚 is smaller or greater than approximately 1.59.
As one goal of this paper is to extend Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and gain new
insights, a critical question is whether or not our assumptions are introducing spurious
results via effects that do not exist in Grossman and Shapiro (1984). One check is how the
equilibrium prices compare and indeed the price in (20) has the same limiting properties. As
the advertising intensity 훼 becomes large, and we ideally approach perfect information, the
price approaches the competitive price; an increase in the mass of the active firms produces
the same effect. The profit gross of advertising costs in (21) shares the same properties.
We close the present Section by recalling that similarly to previous work, the covered
market and unit demand assumptionsmake the symmetric equilibrium price in (20) consistent
with surplus maximization.
5. THE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE ADVERTISING GAME
We now move back to the stage in which the mass 푚 of firms simultaneously choose
their advertising intensities, correctly expecting a monopolistically competitive equilibrium
in the pricing stage. Given (21), we can express each firm’s expected profit and first order
condition for an interior optimum as
Π
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚
)
= ◦휋
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚
)
− 푐(훼)
and as
휕Π
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚
)
휕훼
=
푡
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 − 푐′(훼) = 0. (22)
17It is straightforward to show there always exist values of 푣 such that 푡 ≤ 푣 ≤ ◦푣, i.e., that the covered market
assumption plus the upper bound on 푣 does not eliminate the monopolistically competitive equilibrium. The
condition simplifies to (훼̂ 푚)2 + 1 < 푒훼̂ 푚, which is always verified.
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Because the expected revenue per buyer is independent of 훼, convexity of the cost function
푐(훼) guarantees an optimum for the firm. Because the cost function is strictly convex, its
first derivative admits an inverse (푐′)−1, and we can conveniently express (22), with a slight
abuse of notation, as 훼 = (푐′)−1 (훼̂, 푚). For any given value of 푚 inherited from the
previous stage, a candidate equilibrium advertising level is thus a value of 훼̂ such that
훼̂ =
(
푐′
)−1 (훼̂, 푚) .
In equilibrium, 훼 = 훼̂, so 훼̂ is implicitly defined by the function18
퐻
(
훼̂; 푡, 푚
) ≡ 푡
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 (1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) − 푐′ (훼̂) ≡ 0. (23)
For uniqueness of equilibrium (and to use the Implicit Function Theorem in our analysis),
we need the first partial derivative w.r.t. 훼̂,
퐻훼̂
(
훼̂; 푡, 푚
)
= 푡푚푒
−훼̂ 푚
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 − 푡 4훼̂푚2(2 (훼̂ 푚)2)2 (1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) − 푐′′ (훼̂) .
to have negative sign - namely, we need the sellers’ advertising intensities to be strategic
substitutes, in a symmetric setting. Lemma 3 shows that this is indeed the case.
Lemma 3. 퐻훼̂
(
훼̂; 푡, 푚
)
< 0.
Finally, again because the expected revenue per buyer is independent of 훼, the cross-
partial of profit evaluated at 훼̂ and ◦푝 is zero, and so profits are locally concave in the two
variables.19 Thus, for any 푚, if the conditions for the monopolistically competitive pricing
equilibrium are met, we have a unique price and advertising pair.
Corollary 1. If 훼̂ 푚 > log(2) and 푣 < ◦푣, then there is a unique symmetric monopolistically
competitive advertising and price pair
(
훼̂, ◦푝
)
.
We then turn to the comparative static properties of the equilibrium, in particular how
the exogenous parameters affect aggregate advertising 훼̂ 푚.
5.1. Comparative statics for exogenous 푚. In addition to giving intuition regarding the
mechanics of the model, our comparative statics results summarized in Table 1 help us
to interpret the existence conditions (18) and (19) in terms of the exogenous variables
advertising and transportation costs. Deriving the comparative statics also serves a purpose
by allowing a different check that our modeling is consistent with Grossman and Shapiro
(1984). Indeed the sign of all the comparative statics are identical, suggesting that the
underlying mechanisms at work are the same; we thus refer to Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
for a general discussion and simply present the summary of the comparative statics for
exogenous 푚 (labeled “ the oligopoly model” in Grossman and Shapiro (1984)) below with
the derivations in Appendix B.
To ease comparison, recall that our advertising level 훼 is denoted by 휙 in Grossman and
Shapiro (1984). For cost, we focus on two specific, standard types of changes to give insight.
First, we consider a unit increase in marginal cost independent the level of marginal cost
푐′(훼). One could also view this as asking the effect of a small per-unit tax on advertising.
Second, we specify costs as 푐̃ ≡ 푘푐(훼) and consider the effect of a change in 푘 on 푘 푐′(훼).
The latter case includes cost functions such as 푐̃ = 퐹 + 푘훼22 , which we consider in Section7 below. In this case, since marginal costs are increasing, a unit increase in 푘 results in a
18This is equivalent to condition (11b) in Grossman and Shapiro (1984), once one substitutes for their price in
(11a).
19That is, at 훼̂ and ◦푝, 휋훼 푝 = 0 (as 훼 enters linearly in demand, i.e. demand could be written as퐷 = 훼 퐷̃, where
퐷̃ is expected demand per buyer, so 휋훼 푝 = 훼
(
퐷̃ + 푝휕퐷̃∕휕푝
)), so 휋훼훼휋푝푝 − 휋2훼푝 > 0.
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greater increase in marginal cost the higher the level of advertising. One could also view
this as the effect of a small ad-valorem (based on the marginal cost) tax on each unit of
advertising. These two forms have very different implications on profits and so entry.
Endogenous variables
푝 훼̂ 훼̂ 푚 휋
Exogenous 퐹 0 0 0 −푡 + + + +
variables 푐′(훼) + − − −푘 + − − ?
푚 − − + −
TABLE 1. Comparative statics analysis with exogenous values of 푚. The
question mark indicates that if marginal cost is relatively large, compared
to the total cost, then profit increases (a possibility noted by Grossman and
Shapiro (1984)); otherwise they decrease. For example, with a quadratic
variable cost, an increase in 푘 increases profits.
From the comparative statics we see that as increases in transportation costs increase both
the equilibrium price and aggregate advertising, it relaxes both equilibrium condition (18)
and (19).20 Note that while by itself an increase in aggregate advertising would decrease the
equilibrium price, the direct effect of transportation cost dominates. As a result, the second
condition (19) increases monotonically in 푡.
The effect of an increase in advertising cost tightens condition (18) as it reduces ag-
gregate advertising. The effect on condition (19) is more complicated, reflecting the non-
monotonicity aggregate advertising has on the condition, but not having a direct effect on
price unlike transportation costs. That is, because increases in advertising costs decrease
aggregate advertising, and decreases in aggregate advertising first tighten and then relaxes
the second condition (19), so too does increases in advertising costs first tighten and then
relaxes the second condition (19). Instances of both of these points are shown in the example
in Section 7 below.
5.2. Welfare comparison in the advertising stage. Having established that our model is
consistent with Grossman and Shapiro (1984), we turn to examine how the monopolistically
competitive outcome for given mass of firms 푚 compares to the social outcome. We find
instead that advertising is always socially insufficient (recall that there is unit demand and
the market covered assumption, so the price has no welfare effect though in that sense the
following proposition is a second-best statement). That is, the welfare gain from better
matching always outweighs the capture effect even when the demand creation effect is
negligible.
Proposition 4. For a fixed value of 푚, the symmetric monopolistically competitive equilib-
rium has too little advertising compared to the social optimum.
Remark 1. The proof of Proposition 4 actually establishes a more general result: for a
fixed value of 푚, the marginal social benefit per firm from increasing advertising is greater
than the marginal private benefit of each firm. Thus, e.g., at the socially optimal level of
entry there is too little advertising.
Given the findings in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) – who find that there is always
excessive adverting – our result of insufficient advertising is surprising. As Grossman and
Shapiro (1984) make clear, though, their results are for when every consumer receives a
least one advertisement so there is no demand creation effect there (as there is here). As a
20Of course, it eventually binds against the covered market assumption.
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firm does not capture the entire surplus from demand creation, having the demand creation
effect could be sufficient to reverse the results and have society wanting the firms to advertise
more and indeed Christou and Vettas (2008) report that when there is demand creation in
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) (i.e., not all consumers receive at least one ad), then there can
be socially insufficient advertising.
However, our result is for all equilibria including ones in which there is very little demand
creation (i.e., each consumer receives at least one advertisement with probability close to
one). There are intuitive reasons to expect this result, since as Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
noted, with incomplete information each firm is potentially competing not only with nearby
consumers as in the complete information Salop model, but also for far away consumers
who would find the firm’s product a bad match. This competitive pattern forces down
the price and the firms’ private return to advertising. Yet Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
find excessive advertising. There are several possible factors that together could explain
the discrepancy. First, the assumption in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) does more than
eliminate the demand creation effect, as it overstates the firm’s demand conditioned on the
consumers receiving an advertisement from the firm – making the private marginal return
to advertising for a firm greater than it actually is, so the true market equilibrium level is
less than their approximation yields. Second, their assumption implies that each consumer
receives advertisements from at least two firms, which in turn implies the probability of
receiving an advertisement from at least three firms, etc., is large.21 As a result, the marginal
advertisement does not have a large improvement in match/expected transportation costs and
the marginal reduction in transportation cost from another advertisement is smaller in the
approximation than the exact expression when their assumption holds (i.e., the number of
firms is large or the probability of receiving an advertisement is large). That is, even ignoring
the elimination of the demand creation effect, their assumption makes the social return to
advertising smaller than it actually is. Third, in their model increase advertising is similar to
entry in the Salop model: by advertising more a firm reaches a consumer who already knows
the location of at least one other firm. As is well known, entry is socially excessive in the
Salop model and this may be driving the cases of socially excessive advertising in Grossman
and Shapiro (1984). In contrast, Butters (1977) finds socially optimal advertising. Further,
the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type modeling of a continuum of firms does not inherently have
excessive entry and for this reason, our model may be closer to capturing the pure advertising
effects. Finally, the analysis in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) restricts the firms’ deviation
prices away from both the supercompetitive and monopoly price. As we shown here, the
condition for the latter to hold here is not irrelevant and so including it in the analysis of the
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model could affect the conclusions there. Likewise, including
the firm’s ability to deviate to the supercompetitive price in Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
could affect their conclusions. For example, in the benchmark case of the numerical analysis
in Grossman and Shapiro (1984), it would seem a deviation to the supercompetitive price is
more profitable than their equilibrium price.
6. THE ENTRY STAGE
In this section we move back to the beginning of the game to determine the measure of
the set of the active firms under free entry. Given our assumption of a large set of potential
sellers, equilibrium then holds if profits given 푚̂ firms entering are zero - that is, given 푚̂
the resulting equilibrium advertising 훼̂ in (23) and equilibrium price ◦푝 in (20). The mass of
sellers 푚 compatible with free entry is defined by22.
휋(푚) = 푡
2 푎(푚)푚)2
(1 − 푒−푎(푚)푚) − 푐(푎(푚)) − 퐹 = 0. (24)
21See footnote 11 for details.
22This is condition (11c) in Grossman and Shapiro (1984).
16
Endogenous variables
Exog. 푚 Endog. 푚
푝 훼̂ 훼̂ 푚 휋 | 푝 훼̂ 푚 훼̂ 푚
Exogenous 퐹 0 0 0 − | + + − −푡 + + + + | + 0 + +
variables 푐′(훼) + − − − | + 0 − −푘 + − − ?⋆ | +? ?⧫ ?⋆ −?
푚 − − − − |
TABLE 2. Comparative statics analysis with endogenous values of 푚.
Question mark indicate that if marginal cost is relatively large to total
cost, then profit increases (a possibility noted by Grossman and Shapiro
(1984)); otherwise they decrease. For example, with a quadratic variable
cost, an increase in 푘 increases profits.
⋆ If marginal cost is relatively large to total cost, then positive.
⧫ If marginal cost is relatively large to total cost, then this decreases.
For the case of 푘 on 푝 and 훼̂, even examples with profits increasing have
aggregate advertising decreasing (and so price increasing). For changes
in costs, if the marginal cost of advertising does not increase uniformly
for all levels of 훼 (the 푘 case), then it is possible in which an increase in
advertising cost increases profits (as Grossman and Shapiro (1984) note)
Denote 푚̂ as the entry equilibrium defined by (24) and so 푎 (푚̂) is the corresponding
market equilibrium of advertising. From Lemma 13 in Appendix B , profits are decreasing
in entry, namely 푑휋푑푚 < 0 , the equilibrium is unique. With this, the comparative statics whenentry is endogenous can be derived.
6.1. Comparative Statics. Table 2 summarizes our results concerning the comparative
statics with endogenous 푚, which again are in line with those of Grossman and Shapiro
(1984). The proofs are in Appendix B.23 For convenience, we also include the results already
reported in Table 1 for exogenous values of 푚.
6.2. Welfare comparison with entry. With the characterization of the entry equilibrium
we turn to how the market entry equilibrium compares to the welfare optimal. That is,
given the market level of entry and corresponding equilibrium advertising level, would the
planner encourage or discourage entry? Despite entry not having the positive welfare effect
of reducing the average distance for consumers, we find that there is always insufficient
entry, much like there was insufficient advertising for fixed 푚 in Proposition 4.24 As with
Proposition 5, the proof is more general: for any fixed 훼 (including the one selected by the
planner), the market would have less entry than the planner would choose.
Proposition 5. The symmetric monopolistically competitive equilibrium has too little entry
compared to the social optimum.
Although Proposition 5 may be initially surprising, the proof reveals that the underlying
mechanism is the same as for Proposition 4. This is because the planner’s problem could
be viewed as choosing the optimal aggregate advertising (훼푚) in (8) subject to minimizing
23Our 훼 – the advertising level – corresponds to 휙 in Grossman and Shapiro (1984). Recall that for cost, we
consider two types of changes on the cost function. First, a unit increase in marginal cost independent the level
of marginal cost (푐′(훼)). The second is to specify costs as 푐̃ ≡ 푘푐(훼) and consider the effect of a change in 푘 on
푘 푐′(훼). For example, if costs are 푐̃ = 푘훼22 , the effect is expressed by the derivative with respect to 푐.24Recall that with unit demand and covered market assumptions, price plays no welfare role. More generally,
Proposition 5 could be understood as a second-best statement (i.e., given the market price).
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costs through entry and advertising levels since entry has no direct effect on the average
distance consumers incur in buying their product. As the costs are the same to the firms
as to society, the question is only if the social benefit of the marginal increase in aggregate
advertising is greater or less than the private. Since the social benefit was greater when the
choice was advertising level for fixed entry, then it is greater when the choice is entry with
fixed advertising level, as that too increases aggregate advertising.
A different way in which Proposition 5 may seem initially surprising is that generally in
strategic models there is excessive rather than insufficient entry (Mankiw and Whinston,
1986). However, here as there is a continuum of firms, while the result for excessive entry
in Mankiw and Whinston (1986) requires each firm to have measure. That is, while there is
business stealing here (each firm’s gain is at another firm’s loss), there is not the strategic
effect needed. Indeed, in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model there could be too little entry
depending on the consumers’ preferences.
As in the case of Proposition 4, the proof of Proposition 5 actually establishes a more
general result: For fixed 훼, the marginal social benefit from entry is greater than the marginal
private benefit of entry. This implies that if the firms were forced to advertise at the efficient
level, profits would be negative and there would be fewer active firms.
7. AN EXAMPLE
To provide some further understanding of the results, we investigate an example in which
the advertising cost, at the firm level, is expressed by the function
푐휒 (훼) =
휒 훼2
4
+ 퐹 ,
for given parameters 휒 and 퐹 in ℝ++. In a symmetric equilibrium, each firm then choosesits advertising intensity 훼 to maximize its profit
Π휒
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚
)
= 훼 푡
2훼̂2푚2
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
−
휒 훼2
4
− 퐹 .
Convexity of the cost function guarantees that the first order condition for an optimum in
(22), which reads
푑Π휒 (훼)
푑훼
= 푡
2훼̂2푚2
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
−
휒 훼
2
= 0,
identifies an optimal choice of 훼 for each firm. Setting 훼 = 훼̂, we can then obtain the condition
for the candidate monopolistically competitive equilibrium value of the advertising intensity:
푡
2훼̂2푚2
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
−
휒 훼̂
2
= 0. (25)
Inspection of the LHS of (25) reveals that for any given value of 푚, there exists a unique,
positive value of 훼̂ which is potentially compatible with an equilibrium, and does qualify as
an equilibrium if (18) and (19) are verified.
In Figure 2a, we plot the values of the main endogenous variables for values of the
variable cost parameter 휒 between 0 and 0.9 - which approximately coincides with the
largest value of 휒 for which the aggregate advertising intensity is no smaller than log(2),
as required by (18). Larger values of the cost parameter correspond to a lower advertising
intensity and thus to higher prices, given the greater probability that any buyer reached
by a seller will not receive other advertisements. The balance of the effect of the reduced
competition and the lower marked coverage is such that the sellers’ profits increase with the
advertising cost parameter. The greatest value of the preference parameter 푣 compatible with
equilibrium existence, ◦푣, is only affected by changes in the cost parameter via the equilibrium
advertising intensity, and its response follows the pattern indicated in the discussion of (19).
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(A) Different values of
the (variable) cost pa-
rameter with an exoge-
nous mass of active
sellers.
(B) Different values of
the fixed cost parame-
ter with an endogenous
mass of active sellers.
(C) Different values of
the variable cost pa-
rameter with an en-
dogenous mass of ac-
tive sellers.
(D) Different values of
both the fixed and the
variable cost parame-
ter with an endogenous
mass of active sellers.
FIGURE 2
In the case of free entry, under our assumption that the number of sellers is sufficiently
large that some sellers choose not to be active, an equilibrium is a pair (훼̂, 푚) that solves
the system comprised of (25) and the zero profit-condition
Π휒
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚
)|||훼=훼̂ = 0, (26)
Figures 2d, 2b and Figure 2c respectively illustrate the responses of the main endogenous
variables in cases of changes of the fixed cost 퐹 , changes of the variable cost parameter 휒
and proportional changes of the two parameters. As in the case of Figure 2a, the plot covers
a set of values of the parameters such that (18) is verified. The non-monotonic response of
◦푣 persists in the face of changes of both 훼 and 푚 induced by changes of the cost parameters
with free entry. If only one of the cost parameters changes, then the changes in 훼 and 푚 take
opposite directions. Identical proportional increases of both parameters, do not affect the
advertising intensity, in the specific case of a quadratic cost function, and reduce the size of
the set of the active firms.
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8. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a tractable model that captures the essence of Grossman and Shapiro
(1984), without approximations or the requirement that essentially every consumer receives
at least one advertisement, which was needed for their general results. The model also
rectifies the issues of existence of the monopolistically competitive equilibrium (Christou
and Vettas, 2008) from either deviating up to the monopoly price or deviating down to the
supercompetitive price of Salop. Tractability, achieved by modeling the sellers’ population
as a continuum, as that of the buyers, allowed us to provide explicit conditions for the
monopolistically competitive equilibrium to hold.
In addition to the theoretical contributions, we obtain new insights. In particular, one
inference of Grossman and Shapiro (1984) is that when in equilibrium nearly all consumers
receive at least one ad, there is excessive advertising. However, we show that in our model
even when nearly all consumers receive at least one ad, there is still socially too little
advertising. In fact, there always is insufficient socially insufficient advertising in the
monopolistically competitive equilibrium rather than excessive advertising. The intuition
comes from Grossman and Shapiro (1984): with incomplete information competition is no
longer localized, as is the case in the full information setting of Salop (1979). That is, here
the firm not only competes for consumers with its nearest neighbor (as in Salop) but also for
consumers far away, and so may face a rival with a good match for the consumer. This extra
competition reduces the equilibrium price. As our model (like its predecessors) assumes
unit demand and covered market, it eliminates a potentially positive effect from advertising:
more advertising results in lower prices (what Grossman and Shapiro (1984) call the quantity
demanded effect). This situation suggests, more generally (e.g., with downward sloping
demand), that there may be insufficient informative advertising in an oligopoly setting.
We then endogenize entry, finding that there is socially too little entry rather that socially
excessive entry as found in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) even though entry does not have
the direct social benefit of reducing transportation cost (i.e., a better match) that exists in
Grossman and Shapiro (1984). This result is in contrast to the standard result of excessive
entry even though business stealing –one firm’s sale often comes at the expense of another
firm– is present. However, one difference is with a continuum of firms, each firm has zero
measure, which violates a requirement for the excess entry result (Mankiw and Whinston,
1986). Indeed, in the seminal monopolistic-competitive model Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
find there can be too little or too much entry. The reason is because advertising has convex
costs, entry is a second tool to “produce” advertising and so the planner chooses entry and
advertising levels to minimize costs for a given level of aggregate advertising. That is, just
like the firm does not capture the full social value of the marginal increase in advertising,
the firm does not capture the full social value of entry on aggregate advertising. As a result,
our results may be closer to the pure question of the role of advertising.
Finally, tractability of our model allows for new questions to be asked within the frame-
work, which can therefore be a valuable tool for further analysis. From this point of view,
the framework can allow us to extend the analysis of the paper in future research without
encountering the difficulties that are present in Grossman and Shapiro (1984), whereby
the main results are derived by using approximations that among other things rule out
demand creation. Likewise, although Christou and Vettas (2008) provide many insights,
their analysis could not be extended to endogenizing entry nor explicit conditions derived
for the equilibrium.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1.
Part I. We first show that if the assignment 휌 were subject to the constraint of a given total
advertising intensity 푅 ∈ ℝ++, written as
∫
1
0
휌(푠) 푑푠 ≤ 푅, (A.1)
and we disregarded the advertising cost, then surplus maximization would require an iden-
tical advertising intensity across (almost) all addresses in [0, 1). Let Ψ휌(푥, 푠) denote theprobability that a buyer with address 푥 will not receive an advertisement from any sellers
with address in (푥 − 푠, 푥 + 푠), under a generic assignment 휌; if necessary, all distributions
considered here can be completed by including a point with positive mass that corresponds
to a utility level of 0, as in the case of 휙휌 in (6). For each buyer, receiving advertisementsfrom multiple sellers at the same distance 푠 has probability 0, and the dynamics of Ψ휌(푥, 푠)is expressed by the differential equation
푑Ψ휌(푥, 푠)
푑푠
= −(휌(푥 − 푠) + 휌(푥 + 푠)) Ψ휌(푥, 푠).
By integrating both sides of the previous equation and using the initial conditionΨ휌(푥, 푥) = 1,we obtain
Ψ휌(푥, 휉) = exp
(
−∫
휉
푥
(휌(푥 − 푠) + 휌(푥 + 푠)) 푑푠
)
. (A.2)
Under the given uniform distribution of the buyers, convexity of Ψ휌(푥, 휉), viewed as afunction of the integral in (A.2), implies via Jensen’s inequality that the probability of
receiving no advertisements from sellers at distances no greater than 휉, averaged across
buyers, is minimized if Ψ휌(푥, 휉) is independent of the buyer’s address 푥. As (A.1) shouldhold as an equality, this requirement is in turn satisfied if the advertising intensity is equal to
푅 for (almost) every 푠 ∈ [0, 1). Setting Ψ휌(휉) = ∫ 10 Ψ푟(푥, 휉) 푑푥, and using 휌 = 푟 to denotethe uniform assignment, we thus have
Ψ푟(휉) ≤ Ψ휌(휉) (A.3)
where strict inequality holds in the presence of differences with positive measure between 휌
and 푟 over any subinterval of
[
0, 12
)
.
Because receiving and not receiving an advertisement from a seller within any distance
푦 are complementary events, we can set 휙휌(푥, 푠) = −휓휌(푥, 푠), where 휓휌(푥, 푠) = 푑Ψ휌(푥,푠)푑푠 is
the density function associated with Ψ휌(푥, 푠), and 휓휌(푠) = ∫ 10 휓휌(푥, 푠) 푑푥, and rewrite theexpected total surplus as
∫
1
0
(
∫
1
2
0
휙휌(푥, 푠) (푣 − 푡 푠) 푑푠
)
푑푥 = ∫
1
2
0
(
∫
1
0
휙휌(푥, 푠) (푣 − 푡 푠) 푑푥
)
푑푠
= ∫
1
2
0
(
∫
1
0
(
−휓휌(푥, 푠)
)
(푣 − 푡 푠) 푑푥
)
푑푠
= ∫
1
2
0
(
−(푣 − 푡 푠) ∫
1
0
휓휌(푥, 푠) 푑푥
)
푑푠
= −∫
1
2
0
(푣 − 푡 푠)휓휌(푠) 푑푠.
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Integration by parts allows us to further work out the previous expression as follows:
−∫
1
2
0
(푣 − 푡 푠)휓휌(푠) 푑푠 = − (푣 − 푡 푠) Ψ휌(푠)
||| 120 − 푡 ∫
1
2
0
푡Ψ휌(푠) 푑푠
= 푣 −
(
푣 − 푡
2
)
Ψ휌
(1
2
)
− 푡 ∫
1
2
0
Ψ휌(푠) 푑푠,
where Ψ휌(푠) = ∫ 휓휌(푠) 푑푠. We can then establish that the surplus under the uniformassignment 푟 is no smaller than the surplus under a generic assignment 휌 by noting that
Ψ푟
(
1
2
) ≤ Ψ휌 ( 12) and (A.3) imply
∫
1
0
(
∫
1
2
0
휙푟(푥, 푠) (푣 − 푡 푠) 푑푠
)
푑푥 − ∫
1
0
(
∫
1
2
0
휙푟(푥, 푠) (푣 − 푡 푠) 푑푠
)
푑푥
=
(
푣 − 푡
2
) (
Ψ휌
(1
2
)
− Ψ푟
(1
2
))
+ 푡
(
∫
1
2
0
Ψ휌(푠) 푑푠 − ∫
1
2
0
Ψ휌(푠) 푑푠
)
≥ 0.
To minimize the total advertising cost with a given mass 푚 of active sellers, all sellers
should choose the same advertising intensity. The minimized total cost of any admissible
assignment 휌 for a given mass 푚 of active sellers is then achieved by setting 휇푥 = 푚휌푥푅 for
each address 푥 ∈ [0, 1), and is equal to 푅푐
(
푅
푚
)
. Optimality of the uniform assignment
therefore persists even if the surplus levels net of the minimized cost are considered.
Part II. As we know from Part I, the cost of implementing the uniform assignment 푟 is
minimized if 휇푥 = 푚푅푅 = 푚 holds for every 푥 ∈ [0, 1). Setting 휌푥 = 훼 푚 in (A.2), for every
푥 ∈ [0, 1), we can express 1 − Ψ∗푟 (푥, 휉), the cumulative distribution of the distance from theseller with whom any buyer is matched, as an exponential distribution with parameter 2 훼 푚,
which in turn allows us to obtain (7) from (6).
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2. As mentioned in the text we build on Proposition 1 and focus
directly on cases in which the sellers are uniformly distributed over [0, 1).
Part I. (9) expresses the first order condition for maximization of 푤 (훼, 푚) w.r.t. 푚 if each
seller chooses the optimal scale of production 훼, which is independent of 푚. The LHS of
(4) is the limit of the LHS of (9) as 푚→ 0, and its positivity guarantees existence of a value
of 푚 at which both (9) and the second order-condition for an optimal choice are verified.
Part II. (11) expresses the first order condition for maximization of 푤 (훼, 푚) w.r.t. 훼 for a
given mass 푚 of sellers, and (5) guarantees positivity of the limit of its LHS for conveniently
small values of 훼. Continuity of 휕푤(훼,푚)휕훼 allows then us to conclude that there must thenexist a positive value of 훼 for which the first and second order conditions for the planner’s
problem are verified.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 1. As each buyer who receives an advertisement is a captive buyer
with probability exp (−훼̂ 푚), the reference seller can realize an expected profit equal to
훼 exp
(
−훼̂ 푚
)
푝′ > 0 by charging a price 푝′ ∈ (0, 푝푀). Both the optimized profit and theprice allowing the seller to achieve it must therefore be positive as well.
Moreover, if the reference seller set her price equal to 푝 > 0, then each advertisement
delivered would lead to a transaction, and the seller’s expected profit would be equal to
훼 푝. By contrast, any alternative (positive) price 푝′′ < 푝 would yield an expected profit of
훼 푝′′ < 훼 푝, and its choice would therefore be dominated by the choice of 푝.
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A.4. Proof of Lemma 2. We consider separately the cases of 푝 ≤ 푝푀 and 푝 > 푝푀 . If
푝 ≤ 푝푀 , then a price no lower than 푝 can only possibly be accepted by the captive buyers.Hence, the result follows from the fact that 푝푀 is the unique solution to the monopoly pricingproblem that the seller would correspondingly face.
If 푝 > 푝푀 , then the reference seller could out-compete the more distant sellers with apositive probability, albeit the buyers at a distance greater than 푣−푝푡 would not purchase herproduct even if they were captive buyers. The expected demand if 푝 ∈ (푝푀 , 푝) and its firstderivative are then
퐷(푝) = 2훼
(
∫
1
2−
푝−푝̂
푡
0
exp
(
−2 훼̂ 푚
(
훽 − 푝̂ − 푝
푡
))
푑훽 + ∫
푣−푝
푡
1
2−
푝−푝̂
푡
exp
(
−훼̂ 푚
)
푑훽
)
= ..., (A.4)
휕퐷(푝)
휕푝
= −2훼
푡
exp
(
2훼̂
푡
(
푝̂ − 푝
))
.
Since the derivative is negative, increases of 푝 above 푝푀 lead to a lower profit, and also inthis case 푝푀 is an optimal choice in the interval
[
푝푀 , 푝
].
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3. The first derivatives of the profit equations in (17) are
휕휋−
휕푝
= 훼
(
2
푡
(
푝̂ − 2푝
)
+ 1
훼̂
+ 푒
2훼̂
푡 (푝̂−푝)−훼̂
(
2푝
푡
− 1
훼̂
))
, (A.5)
휕휋+
휕푝
= 훼
(
푒−훼̂
(2
푡
(
2푝 − 푝̂
)
− 1
훼̂
)
+ 푒
2훼̂
푡 (푝̂−푝)
(
1
훼̂
− 2푝
푡
))
. (A.6)
(A.5) and (A.6), evaluated at 푝 = 푝̂, are respectively the left- and the right-derivative of the
seller’s profit at the symmetric equilibrium price, and the necessary conditions for 푝 = 푝̂ to
be a best response to the competitors’ choice of 푝̂ are
휕휋−
휕푝
||||푝=푝̂ = 0, (A.7)
휕휋+
휕푝
||||푝=푝̂ = 0. (A.8)
Both (A.7) and (A.8) are verified iff 푝̂ is equal to ◦푝 in (20). It is also readily verified
that 훼̂ 푚 > log(2) is equivalent to negativity of the second derivative of 휋+ at 푝 = ◦푝;
훼̂ 푚 > log(2) also guarantees a negative second derivative of 휋−, and thereby ensures local
profit maximization.
As to other possible maximizers of 휋− and 휋+, separately considered, if the seller’s
competitors set their prices equal to ◦푝, (A.7) also holds at 푝 = 푝−, where
푝− = 푡
2훼̂ 푚
(
1 − 훼̂ 푚 − log(2)
)
, (A.9)
This price can however be disregarded, as (A.9) and 훼̂ 푚 > log(2) imply
푝− < 푡
2훼̂ 푚
(1 − 2 log(2)) < 0.
(A.8) also admits a further real solution at 푝 = 푝+, where
푝+ = 푡
2훼̂ 푚
(1 + 훼̂ 푚 − log(2)), (A.10)
However, evaluation of the second derivative reveals that if 훼̂ 푚 > log(2), then 푝+ actually
corresponds to a local minimum of 휋+.
Even if 훼̂ 푚 > log(2), we must still consider the possibility of non-interior best responses
to the competitors’ choice of ◦푝 before concluding that ◦푝 is a symmetric equilibrium price.
For prices below ◦푝, the fact that 푝− in (A.9) is negative and differentiability of 휋− imply that
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휕휋−
휕푝 is negative between 0 and ◦푝, and therefore rules out any price lower than ◦푝 as a best
response to ◦푝.
For prices above ◦푝, it is readily verified that the minimum point 푝+ in (A.10) satisfies
푝+ ∈
(
◦푝, 푝
)
. If 푝 ≤ 푝푀 , and the profit function is expressed by (17b) over
[
◦푝, 푝
]
, then the
seller’s profit achieves a local maximum over the same interval at 푝 = 푝. If 푝 > 푝푀 , then the
profit is expressed by (17b) over
[
◦푝, 푝푀
]
, and by (A.4) over [푝푀 , 푝]; if 푝푀 > 푝+, then 푝푀
could in principle dominate ◦푝, from the seller’s point of view. In both scenarios, Lemma 2
guarantees that the choice of 푝푀 dominates the choice of 푝, regardless of the ranking of thetwo prices. The critical value of 푣 in (19) is then obtained by comparing the expected profits
realized by charging ◦푝 and by charging 푝푀 , respectively expressed by ◦휋 in (21) and by
휋̂푀 = 훼 exp
(
−훼̂ 푚
) (
푣 − 푡
2
)
.
A.6. Proof of Lemma 3. The first two terms of퐻훼̂ collected yields
퐻훼̂(훼̂; 푡, 푚) = 푡
(2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2
2 훼̂3푚2
− 푐′′
(
훼̂
)
.
The numerator of the first term, (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2 is decreasing in 훼̂ and the numerator is
therefore maximized at 훼̂ = 0. The numerator evaluated at 훼̂ = 0 is negative and so the first
term is always non-positive and the entire expression negative.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 4. The monopolistically competitive equilibrium is defined by
(23)
푡
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 (1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) − 푐′ (훼̂) = 0.
Multiplying both sides by 푚 we have
푚푡
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 (1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) − 푚푐′(훼) = 0. (A.11)
The marginal effect of increased advertising on welfare is expressed by the LHS of (11). As
the private and social cost are identical, whether the social optimum features a greater or
smaller advertising intensity than the symmetric monopolistically competitive equilibrium,
depends on whether the social marginal benefit is greater than the private benefit at 훼̂, namely
on the direction of the inequality
푒−훼̂ 푚
(
푣푚 +
푡
(
푒훼̂ 푚 − 훼̂2 푚2 − 훼̂ 푚 − 1
)
2 훼̂2 푚
)
− 푚푡
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 (1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) ⋛ 0 (A.12)
The LHS of (A.12) is positive at 푡 = 0 and decreasing in 푡 with a root at 푡 = 2 훼̂ 푚 푣1+훼̂ 푚 . However,
for any 푡 greater than 2 훼̂ 푚 푣1+훼̂ 푚 there is no longer a symmetric monopolistically competitiveequilibrium as the price required for such an equilibrium would be greater than the monopoly
price 푣 − 푡∕2 (and so firms would deviate from that price).
A.8. Proof of Proposition 5. The monopolistically competitive free entry equilibrium is
defined by (24)
휋(푚) = 푡
2훼̂(푚)푚)2
(1 − 푒−푎(푚)푚)) − 푐(푎(푚)) − 퐹 = 0.
The marginal effect of entry for fixed 훼 was given by the LHS of (9)
푒−훼 푚
(
푣 +
푡
(
푒훼 푚 − 훼2 푚2 − 훼 푚 − 1
)
2 훼 푚2
)
− 푐 (훼) − 퐹 .
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Thus, if we fixed 훼 at the entry equilibrium 훼, 푎 (푚̂), the expressions represents the marginal
effect of entry when 훼 = 푎 (푚̂). A the private and social cost are the same (퐹 ), whether
the social optimum would increase entry over the symmetric monopolistically competitive
equilibrium, depends on whether the social marginal benefit is greater than the private
benefit or if
푒−푎(푚̂)푚
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝푣 +
푡
(
푒푎(푚̂)푚 − 푎
(
푚̂
)2 푚2 − 푎 (푚̂)푚 − 1)
2 푎
(
푚̂
)
푚2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ −
푡
2 푎
(
푚̂
)
푚2
(1 − 푒−푎(푚̂)푚)
> 0 (A.13)
As with expression (A.12), expression (A.13) is decreasing in 푡 with a root at 푡 = 푣 2,훼̂ 푚1+훼̂ 푚 .
However, as in the proof for Proposition 4, for any 푡 greater than 푣 2 훼̂ 푚1+훼̂ 푚 there is no longera symmetric monopolistically competitive equilibrium as the price required for such an
equilibrium would be greater than the monopoly price 푣 − 푡∕2 (and so firms would deviate
from that price).
APPENDIX B. COMPARATIVE STATICS
Below is a summary table for the derivations in this appendix.
Endogenous variables
Exog. 푚 Endog. 푚
푝 훼̂ 훼̂ 푚 휋 | 푝 훼̂ 푚 훼̂ 푚
Exogenous 퐹 0 0 − | + + − −푡 + + + + | + 0 + +
variables 푐′(훼) + − − − | + 0 − −
푘 + − − ?⋆ | +? ?⧫ ?⋆ −?
푚 − − + − |
⋆ If marginal cost is relatively large to total cost, then this increases.
⧫ If marginal cost is relatively large to total cost, then this decreases
For endogenous 푚, the effect of 푘 on 푝, 훼̂ and 푚, even examples with profits increasing have
aggregate advertising decreasing (and so price increasing). For cost, if the marginal cost of
advertising does not increase uniformly for all levels of 훼 (the 푘 case), then it is possible to
create examples of profits increasing with costs.
B.1. Exogenous m. In this section, 푡, 푚 and the function 푐(훼) are exogenous. In the next
section, 푚 is endogenized and entry costs 퐹 is added as an exogenous variable.
B.1.1. Comparative statics on advertising. Given its optimal price (푝 = 푡∕(2 푎 (푚̂) 푚)), we
can express the profit as
휋
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚
)
=
훼푡
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 − 푐(훼).
Using primes to denote derivatives, we can write the first order condition for an interior
optimum as
휕휋
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚
)
휕훼
=
푡
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 − 푐′(훼) = 0; (22)
because the expected revenue per buyer is independent of 훼, a well-defined optimum for
the firm is guaranteed by a convex cost function. Because the cost function is monotonic, it
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admits an inverse (푐′)−1, and we can rewrite (22) as
훼 =
(
푐′
)−1 (훼̂, 푚) .
An equilibrium advertising level is thus a fixed point of (푐′)−1 (훼̂, 푚).
In equilibrium, 훼 = 훼̂, so 훼̂ is implicitly defined by the function
퐻(훼̂; 푡, 푚, 푐) ≡ 푡
2 (훼̂ 푚)2
(1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) − 푐′
(
훼̂
) ≡ 0. (23)
To use the implicit function we need퐻훼̂ < 0, which was proved in Lemma 3. However, oneuseful fact from the proof is that (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2 is decreasing in 훼̂ and is maximized at
훼̂ = 0 and so the expression (which appears in various forms below) is always negative.
B.1.2. Comparative statics on equilibrium advertising. With 퐻훼̂ < 0 we can use theimplicit function theorem to derive the effect of 푡, marginal cost 푐′(훼), and 푚 on 훼̂. That is,
on equilibrium advertising and not just on one firm’s advertising level. We begin with the
effect of transport cost 푡 on advertising when the number of firms is fixed.
Lemma 4. With exogenous 푚, increase in transportation cost increases equilibrium adver-
tising: 푑훼̂푑푡 > 0.
Proof. As 푑훼̂푑푡 = −퐻푡∕퐻훼̂ , we need to calculate퐻푡:
퐻푡(훼̂; 푡, 푚, 푐) =
1
2(훼̂(푡, 푚)푚)2
(1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) > 0.
Thus, 푑훼̂푑푡 = −퐻푡∕퐻훼̂ > 0:
푑훼̂
푑푡
= −
퐻푡
퐻훼̂
= −훼̂ (1 + 훼̂ 푚)푒
−훼̂ 푚)
푡((2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2)) − 2훼̂3푚2푐′′
(
훼̂
) > 0 (B.1)

We next turn to the effect of a change in marginal cost and a change on the coefficient of
marginal cost 푘 on the equilibrium of advertising, which are straightforward.25
Lemma 5. A unit decrease in marginal cost or the coefficient of the marginal cost of
advertising increases the equilibrium level of advertising: 푑훼̂푑푐′ < 0 and
푑훼̂
푑푘 < 0.
Proof. As 푑훼̂푑푐′ = −퐻푐′∕퐻훼̂ , we need to calculate퐻푐′ :
퐻푐′
(
훼̂; 푡, 푚, 푐
)
= −푑[푐
′(훼)]
푑[푐′(훼)]
< 0.
Thus, 푑훼̂푑푐′ = −퐻푐′∕퐻훼̂ < 0:
푑훼̂
푑푐′
= −
퐻푐′
퐻훼̂
= 2 훼̂
3푚2
푡((2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2)) − 2훼̂3푚2푐′′
(
훼̂
) < 0.
For when it is a change in 푘 for cost function 푘푐(훼),퐻푘 = −푐′(훼) < 0 and the proof followsanalogously. 
We now turn to the effect of entry on the equilibrium of advertising is derived.
Lemma 6. Entry reduces the equilibrium level of advertising: 푑훼̂푑푚 < 0
25Recall that for the second case we are considering cost functions of the form 푘푐(훼).
26
Proof. By the implicit function theorem 푑훼̂푑푚 = −퐻푚∕퐻훼̂ and so, to establish the sign of
푑훼̂
푑푚 , the sign of퐻푚 needs to be established.
퐻푚
(
훼̂; 푡, 푚, 푐
)
= 푡 훼̂ 푒
−훼̂ 푚
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 − 푡 4 훼̂2푚(2 (훼̂ 푚)2)2 (1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚).
This RHS can be rewritten as
푡 훼̂ 푒−훼̂ 푚
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 − 푡 4 훼̂2푚(2 (훼̂ 푚)2)2 (1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) = 푡 (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒
−훼̂ 푚 − 2
2 훼̂2푚3
< 0,
where the last inequality follows as it was already shown that (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2 is negative
for positive 훼̂. Thus,
푑훼̂
푑푚
= −
퐻푚
퐻훼̂
= −훼̂ 푡((2 + 훼̂ 푚) 푒
−훼̂ 푚 − 2)
푚[푡((2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2)) − 2 훼̂3 푚2푐′′
(
훼̂
)
]
< 0.

The result that entry reduces advertising is intuitively straightforward: if with entry firms
initially maintain the same level of advertising, the representative firm’s marginal benefit
from advertising has decreased (as total advertising by all of its rivals has increased) and so
it is optimal to reduce its advertising.
Finally, the effect of entry on aggregate advertising (훼̂ 푚) is considered.
Lemma 7. Entry increases aggregate advertising: 푑(푎(푚)푚)푑푚 > 0.
Proof. Using the derivation for 푑(푎(푚)푚)푑푚 above we have
푑(푎(푚)푚)
푑푚
= 푑푎(푚)
푑푚
푚 + 푎(푚)
=
−2푐′′
(
훼̂
)
훼̂4 푚2
푡(
(
2 + 훼̂ 푚
)
푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2) − 2푐′′
(
훼̂
)
훼̂3 푚2
> 0,
with the denominator negative because, as has been shown, (2 + 훼̂ 푚) 푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2 > 0. 
At first glance, the result is somewhat surprising that entry always increases aggregate
advertising. With just some pause, it becomes obvious, as if it did not, then equilibrium
price would increase with entry.
Finally, while obvious, it should be noted that entry costs cannot have a direct effect on
advertising levels as they are fixed costs (of course, they will indirectly affect advertising
through their effect on entry level 푚).
B.1.3. Comparative statics on price. With the effect of entry, advertising cost and trans-
portation cost on advertising levels, we can now compute the effect of these parameters on
the equilibrium price, 푝(푡, 푚, 푐) = 푡∕[2훼̂(푡, 푚, 푐)푚]. The effect of either type of change in
marginal cost on price is obvious: since by Lemma 5 advertising is decreasing in marginal
cost, then from the definition of 푝(푡, 푚, 푐) we have immediately
Lemma 8. With exogenous 푚, a unit increase in marginal cost or in the coefficient of
marginal cost of advertising increases the equilibrium price: 푑푝∕푑푐′ > 0 and 푑푝∕푑푘 > 0.
The first non-trivial question is the effect of transportation cost on the equilibrium price
when the number of firms is fixed. There is is an indirect and direct effect. The direct effect
raises price, but the indirect effect reduces it: an increase in 푡 causes 훼̂ to increase, which
causes the price to fall. Again the direct effect dominates:
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Lemma 9. If 푚 is exogenous, an increase in transport cost increases the equilibrium price:
푑푝∕푑푡 > 0.
Proof.
푑푝
푑푡
= 1
2
(
훼̂ 푚
) − 푡
2 훼̂2푚
푑푎(푡)
푑푡
= 1
훼̂ 푚
푡(1 − (1 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2푐′′(훼)훼̂3푚2
푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2푐′′(훼)훼̂3푚2
> 0,
where again the inequality follows because 1 − (1 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚 is increasing in either 훼 or
푚 and at zero value for either is zero, i.e., the expression is non-negative. Therefore, the
numerator and denominator are positive: increased transportation costs raises the equilibrium
price. 
The next question is the effect of entry (푚) on price and given the equilibrium price.
Like with transport cost, there is a direct and indirect effect By the direct effect, entry
reduces the price – there is more competition. However, there is an indirect effect: entry also
reduces advertising, and lower advertising increases price. However, above it was shown
that aggregate advertising increases with entry (푑(훼̂(푡, 푚)푚)∕푑푚 > 0) so, the direct effect
dominates: the price deceases.
Lemma 10. The equilibrium price decreases with entry: 푑푝∕푑푚 < 0.
Proof.
푑푝
푑푚
= 푡
2[푎(푚)푚]2
−푑[푎(푚)푚]
푑푚
< 0,
where 푑(훼̂ 푚)∕푑푚 > 0 by Lemma 7. 
B.1.4. Comparative statics on equilibrium profit. Profit gross of entry costs are
휋
(
훼̂
)
= 푡
2 훼̂ 푚2
(1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) − 푐
(
훼̂
)
. (B.2)
It is perhaps worthwhile to note that this is equilibrium profit. The importance is that changes
in entry or transportation costs will affect profits indirectly through the equilibrium level of
advertising (훼̂(푡, 푚)) and so the envelope theorem from the firm’s first order condition does
not explain the entirety of how changes in advertising affect profits.
We begin again with the effect of an increase in transport cost 푡 on profits when the
number of firms is fixed. Differentiating equilibrium profits with respect to transport cost (푡)
obtains
푑휋(훼̂(푡), 푡)
푑푡
= 휕휋(훼̂(푡), 푡)
휕푡
+ 휕휋(훼̂(푡), 푡)
휕훼̂(푡)
푑푎(푡)
푑푡
. (B.3)
In this case it is easy to see from examining the profit expression that the direct effect is pos-
itive. For the indirect effect, the second term was shown above to be positive: transportation
costs increase the equilibrium levels of advertising. However, intuitively the first part of the
second term is negative as greater equilibrium advertising reduces the price, demand from a
contacted consumer (as there is a greater possibility they received an advertisement from a
better match) and raises cost (this can be easily checked by differentiating (B.2) with respect
to 훼̂). Thus, again the indirect effect runs contrary to the direct effect. However, as in the
previous case the expressions simplify, and it is easy to show that increase in transportation
costs increase profits: the direct effect dominates the indirect effect.
Lemma 11. For exogenous푚, equilibrium profits are increasing in transport cost: 푑휋∕푑푡 >
0.
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Proof. Using (B.1) for 푑훼̂∕푑푡, and differentiating equilibrium profits with respect to 훼̂ and
푡, the expression simplifies to
푑휋(훼̂(푡), 푡)
푑푡
= (1 − 푒
−훼̂ 푚)훼̂2 푐′′(훼)
푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2푐′′(훼) 훼̂3푚2
> 0, (B.4)
where again the first order condition (22) helps to simplify the numerator of the second term
on the RHS of B.3. 
We know turn to the effect of the two types of change in marginal cost of advertising on
profits. Considering the first and differentiating equilibrium profits with respect to a unit
increase in marginal cost (푐′) obtains
푑휋(훼̂(푐′), 푐′)
푑푐′
= 휕휋(훼̂(푐
′), 푐′)
휕훼̂(푐′)
푑훼̂(푐′)
푑푐′
+ 휕휋(훼̂(푐
′), 푐′)
휕푐′
. (B.5)
In this case it is easy to see from examining the equilibrium profits that the direct effect is
negative; a firm is worse off from its marginal cost increasing. For the indirect effect, the
second term was shown above to be negative: marginal cost decreases the equilibrium levels
of advertising. However, as noted when examining the effect of transportation costs on
equilibrium profits (Lemma 11), the first part of the second term intuitively is also negative.
Once again, the indirect effect runs contrary to the direct effect. However, as in the previous
case the expressions simplify, and it is straightforward to show that increase in marginal
costs decreases profits.
Lemma 12. For exogenous 푚, equilibrium profits are decreasing in a uniform increase of
marginal cost of advertising (i.e., a unit increase for all levels of 훼): 푑휋∕푑푐′ < 0.
Proof. It is useful to rewrite the equilibrium profit expression as
휋(훼̂, 푐′) = 푡
2훼̂(푐′)푚2
(1 − 푒−훼̂(푐′)푚) − ∫
훼̂(푐′)
0
푐′(훼)푑훼
Differentiation of the equilibrium profit w.r.t. the marginal advertising cost yields
푑휋(훼̂(푐′), 푐′)
푑푐′
=
[
푡푒−훼̂ 푚
2푚훼̂
− 푡(1 − 푒
−훼̂ 푚)
2(훼̂ 푚)2
− 푐′(훼̂(푐′, 푚)
]
푑훼̂(푐′, 푚)
푑푐′
(B.6)
− ∫
훼̂(푐′,푚)
0
푑푐′(훼)푑훼
The first term (the indirect effect) is positive and the second is negative. Now assuming that
the change across marginal cost is independent of 훼 (i.e., 푑푐′(훼) = 1 for all 훼) yields
푑휋(훼̂(푐′), 푐′)
푑푐′
= −2훼̂
4푚2 푐′′(훼)
푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2훼̂3 푚2 푐′′(훼)
< 0. (B.7)

The assumption that the effect on marginal cost is independent of 훼 is equivalent to the
case of 훽 = 1 in Grossman and Shapiro (1984). Specifically, if their 훽 (the elasticity of the
marginal effect of the shift parameter on cost with respect to the proportion of consumers
reached) equals one (unit elastic), then an increase in the shift parameter has zero effect
on the advertising level (Grossman and Shapiro, 1984, Table 1), which effectively is the
case here.26 Since 휂 > 0 there (and here since 푐′′(훼) > 0), we have the same sign as
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) do for this case: a unit increase in marginal cost reduces
equilibrium profits. It should also be clear that other assumptions could yield equilibrium
profits increasing. For example, if the increase in cost were only on the last units of 훼 and
sufficiently small, then the last term of the RHS of (B.6) is smaller and the expression could
26Specifically here a unit increase in marginal cost increase advertising costs in our model by 훼, and the
derivative of that with respect to 훼 is of course 1.
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be positive. An easier way to see this is to consider the second change to the cost coefficient
푘 (where costs are 푘푐(훼)). In this case, equilibrium profits are
휋(훼̂, 푘)) = 푡
2훼̂(푘)푚2
(1 − 푒−훼̂(푘)푚) − 푘푐(훼̂(푘))
Differentiating profits with respect to 푘 instead of 푐′ is a slight modification to (B.5) with
the same general direct (higher 푘 increases costs) and indirect (higher costs (푘) reduces
equilibrium advertising which benefits the firm) effects. Specifically,
푑휋(훼̂(푘), 푘)
푑푘
=
[
푡푒−훼̂ 푚
2푚훼̂
− 푡(1 − 푒
−훼̂ 푚)
2(훼̂ 푚)2
− 푘푐′(훼̂(푘)
]
푑훼̂(푘)
푑푘
− 푐(훼̂(푘)) (B.8)
This simplifies to
푑휋(훼̂(푘), 푘)
푑푘
= 푡(1 − (1 + 훼̂ 푚)푒
−훼̂ 푚) + 2훼̂2푚2푘푐′
푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2훼̂3푚2 푘 푐′′(훼)
훼̂푐′ − 푐(훼̂(푘)), (B.9)
and its sign depends on the relative size of the marginal cost to total costs. If the former is
sufficiently large, then profits could increase with an increase in 푘, as was noted by Grossman
and Shapiro (1984). In Example 7, we show that with “large” 훼 푚 in equilibrium, quadratic
cost of the form 푘훼2 create such a scenario of an increase in 푘 increases equilibrium profits
and so inducing entry.
We conclude this section by examining the effect of entry on equilibrium profits. Differ-
entiating the RHS of (B.2) with respect to the size of the sellers’ population 푚 yields
푑휋(훼̂(푚), 푚)
푑푚
= 휕휋(훼̂(푚), 푚)
휕푚
+ 휕휋(훼̂(푚), 푚)
휕훼̂(푚)
푑훼̂(푚)
푑푚
. (B.10)
The first term, the direct effect of entry on profits, can be shown to be, as expected, negative.
The second term has the indirect effect of entry through its effect on equilibrium levels of
advertising. As noted just before Lemma 11, the first part of the second term, the effect of
an increase in equilibrium advertising on profits, intuitively is negative as the effect from
all the rivals increasing their advertising reduces the firm’s profit. However, as we know
from Lemma 6, entry reduces the equilibrium level of advertising; hence, the second part of
the second term is also negative, and the second term is positive. The entire expression is
unclear unless costs are strictly convex (a sufficient condition).
Lemma 13. Profits are decreasing in entry: 푑휋푑푚 < 0.
Proof. The RHS of (B.10) simplifies to
푑휋
푑푚
= −푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒
−훼̂ 푚)
2훼̂ 푚3
푡(1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2(훼̂ 푚)2[푐′′(훼) 훼̂ − 푐′]
푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2푐′′(훼) 훼̂3푚2
.
The first order condition (22) can be written as 푡(1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) − 푐′(훼)2(훼̂ 푚)2 = 0 and so the
above simplifies to
푑휋
푑푚
=
−푡[2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚) 푒−훼̂ 푚] 훼̂2 푐′′
(
훼̂
)
푚[푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2 푐′′
(
훼̂
)
훼̂3푚2]
< 0 (B.11)
as 푐′′(훼) > 0. 
B.2. Endogenous m. We now consider the effect of transportation costs 푡, advertising costs
푐, and entry costs 퐹 with the entry level 푚 endogenous, or what Grossman and Shapiro
(1984) refer to as the “monopolistically competitive" model. With this we have another
condition that profits are zero:27
퐽 (푡, 퐹 , 푐) ≡ 푡
2훼̂ 푚2
(1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚)) − 푐(훼̂) − 퐹 = 0. (24)
27This is condition (11c) in Grossman and Shapiro (1984).
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With this and the condition on the equilibrium level of advertising given 푚 we can derive
the comparative statics with the implicit function theorem.
B.2.1. Long run effects on entry. We begin by determining the effect of entry costs and
transportation on the entry equilibrium: 푑푚∕푑퐹 and 푑푚∕푑푡. Using the implicit function
theorem requires that 퐽푚 < 0 and that profits are decreasing in 푚, which has already beenshown in (B.11).
Starting with the effect of entry costs, the effect is immediate:
Lemma 14. Entry is decreasing in entry costs: 푑푚∕푑퐹 < 0.
Proof. 퐽퐹 = −1. From (B.11), 퐽푚 < 0, so 푑푚∕푑퐹 = −퐽퐹 ∕퐽푚 < 0. 
In this case, the expression simplifies neatly to
푑푚
푑퐹
= −
퐽퐹
퐽푚
= 푚[푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒
−훼̂ 푚) + 2푐′′(훼) 훼̂3푚2]
−푡[2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚]훼̂2푐′′(훼)
< 0.
Next consider the effect of transportation cost 푡 on entry. We have already seen that
an increase in transportation cost increases profit (퐽푡 > 0) from (B.4), and so the effect isimmediate:
Lemma 15. Entry increases with transportation cost: 푑푚∕푑푡 > 0.
Proof. From (B.4) we have 퐽푡 > 0 and from (B.11) we have 퐽푚 < 0 and so 푑푚∕푑푡 =
−퐽푡∕퐽푚 > 0. 
In this case too, simplification yields a clean expression:
푑푚
푑푡
= −
퐽푡
퐽푚
= (1 − 푒
−훼̂ 푚)푚
푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚)
> 0. (B.12)
Turning to the effect of constant increase in marginal cost 푐′ on entry, it too follows
almost immediately.
Lemma 16. Entry decreases with a uniform increase of marginal cost of advertising (i.e.,
a unit increase for all levels of 훼): 푑푚∕푑푐′ > 0.
Proof. From expression (B.7) we have 퐽푐′ < 0 and from (B.11) we have 퐽푚 < 0 and so
푑푚∕푑푐′ = −퐽푐′∕퐽푚 < 0. 
With a little algebra, this expression also simplifies cleanly:
푑푚
푑푐′
= 2훼̂
2푚3
−푡[2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚]
< 0 (B.13)
As noted in the preamble this could also be interpreted as the effect of a per-unit tax on
advertising, with it decreasing entry.
Finally, turning to to the effect of a unit increase in marginal cost proportional to the
marginal cost. We have already seen from (B.9) that a proportional increase in marginal
cost (e.g., with costs are 푘훼2, 푑푐∕푑푘), could result in an increase in equilibrium profits if
marginal costs are relatively large (i.e., steeply sloped) on the margin. As a result, the effect
of a change in 푘 could either increase or decrease entry, and in the example below with
quadratic cost, increases entry. To summarize,
Lemma 17. Entry may increase with a proportionate increase of marginal cost of adver-
tising (e.g., when 푐(훼) = 푘훼2, 푑푐∕푑푘), if the marginal cost on the margin is relatively
large.
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B.2.2. Long run effects on advertising. With the effects on entry from transportation,
marginal advertising costs and entry costs, we can establish the entry equilibrium effects
of these costs (transport, advertising and entry) on advertising. Specifically, we can use
the first order condition in equilibrium (23), but now with entry level 푚 as a function of
transportation and fixed costs
퐻(훼̂; 푡, 푐, 푚(푡, 퐹 , 푐)) ≡ 푡
2(훼̂ 푚)2
(1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) − 푐′(훼̂) ≡ 0
to determine the effects of these two costs on advertising in long run (free entry) equilibrium.
We begin with the effect of transportation costs on advertising levels. There is, as usual,
two opposing effects. First, the direct effect of increasing transportation cost for fixed 푚
(positive, established in Lemma 4) leads to more advertising. However, there is also the
indirect effect: increases in 푡 induce entry, which has a negative effect on advertising levels.
These two effects, however, cancel out.
Lemma 18. Increases in transportation costs have no effect on a firm’s advertising level in
the long run: 푑훼̂∕푑푡 = 0.
Proof. In Lemma 3 it was established that퐻훼̂ < 0. With the calculation of 푑푚∕푑푡 (B.12),
퐻푡 =
푡(푒−훼̂ 푚(2 + 훼̂ 푚) − 2)
2훼̂2푚3
푑푚(푡, 퐹 )
푑푡
+ 1 − 푒
−훼̂ 푚
2훼̂2푚2
= 0.
Thus,
푑훼̂
푑푡
=
−퐻푡
퐻훼̂
= 0.

Since increases in transportation cost do not change any one firm’s advertising in the
long run, but does induce entry, it follows that
Corollary 2. Increase in transportation costs, increase aggregate advertising.
The effect of entry costs 퐹 is immediate: since entry costs 퐹 reduce entry 푚, but has no
effect on advertising directly, we have
Lemma 19. Increased entry costs result in greater advertising per firm in the long run:
푑훼̂
푑퐹 > 0.
As it has already been shown in Lemma 7 that entry increases aggregate advertising, and
since entry costs do not effect advertising levels directly, it follows
Corollary 3. Increased entry costs decrease aggregate advertising.
Next we turn to the effect of changes in the costs of advertising on advertising in the long
run. Beginning with a uniform unit increase in marginal cost for advertising (or equivalents
a per-unit tax on advertising), there are two counter effects. On one hand, for fixed number
of firms an increase in marginal cost, reduces equilibrium advertising. However, it also
reduces profits which induces exit, which has a positive effect on advertising, so the net
effect is unclear. It turns out that the effects exactly offset themselves, and so a unit increase
in marginal cost has no effect on the long run equilibrium advertising per firm.
Lemma 20. A unit increase in the marginal cost of advertising has no effect on a firm’s
advertising level in the long run: 푑훼̂∕푑푐′ = 0.
Proof. In Lemma 3, it was established that퐻훼̂ < 0. With the calculation of 푑푚∕푑푐′ (B.13),
퐻푐′ =
푡(푒−훼̂ 푚(2 + 훼̂ 푚) − 2)
2훼̂2푚3
푑푚
푑푐′
− 1 = 0,
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Thus,
푑훼̂
푑푐′
=
−퐻 ′푐
퐻훼̂
= 0.

While the result may initially seem surprising, it too is in line with what Grossman and
Shapiro (1984) found, because as discussed after Lemma 12, 훽 = 1 in this case. Finally,
although the advertising per firm does not change, since the increase in marginal cost induced
exit, aggregate advertising has decreased - witness Lemma 4.
Corollary 4. A per unit-tax on advertising (a unit increase in marginal cost) decreases
aggregate advertising.
Thus, a per-unit tax on advertising level would have the expected effect of reducing
aggregate advertising.
Finally turning to the effect of a proportionate increase in marginal cost 푘, not surprisingly
given Lemma 17, such a change in cost could increase or decrease a firm’s advertising level
in the long run, depending on the relative size of the marginal cost on the margin: if the
marginal cost is relatively small, then it is possible a firm’s advertising increases. The
intuition follows from Lemma 17: if on the margin, marginal cost is relatively small, this
induces exit, which increases the equilibrium level of advertising (Lemma 6). This effect
has to be large enough to offset the direct effect from the increase in marginal cost. For
aggregate advertising, this becomes even more muddled as exit on its own would decrease
aggregate advertising. However, for the quadratic cost example presented in Examle ?, for
“large” 훼̂ 푚, an proportionate increase in marginal cost, decreases aggregate advertising.
That is, the direct effect on an individual firm in reducing its advertising overwhelms the
entry effect on aggregate advertising. Given that quadratic cost produces otherwise some
counter-intuitive results, this suggests that generally a proportionate increase in all marginal
cost will decrease aggregate advertising.
B.2.3. Long run effects on price. The long-run effect of different variables on price is
primarily through the effect on aggregate advertising (훼̂ 푚), and so the above corollaries
on the long-run effects on aggregate advertising determines the effect on price (with the
exception of transport cost). We begin with the most straight-forward by considering the
effect of entry costs 퐹 on the equilibrium price, which is recall
푝 = 푡
2훼̂ 푚
. (B.14)
Because entry increases aggregate advertising (which decreases price), increases in fixed
cost increase the price.
Lemma 21. The long run price is increasing in entry costs: 푑푝∕푑퐹 > 0.
Proof. Differentiation the long run equilibrium price (B.14) with respect to the fixed cost
퐹 we have
푑푝
푑퐹
= 푡
2
−푑훼̂(푚)푚
푑푚
푑푚
푑퐹
1
(훼̂(푚)푚)2
> 0.
The term 푑(훼̂ 푚)∕푑푚 was established as positive in lemma 7. The term 푑푚∕푑퐹 was
determined to be negative in lemma 14. Thus, the total effect is for fixed cost to increase the
equilibrium price because aggregate advertising decreases. 
Next we consider the effect of a unit increase in all marginal costs (푐′). From Corollary
4, we know that a unit increase in all marginal cost decreases aggregate advertising, and so
from (B.14) it increases the long-run price 푑푝∕푑푐′ > 0.
Corollary 5. The long run price is increasing in a uniform increase in marginal cost (or a
small per-unit tax on advertising).
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Turning to the effect of a proportionate increase in marginal cost, as the effect on aggregate
advertising is ambiguous, the effect on the long-run price is ambiguous. Again, turning to
the example of “large” 훼̂ 푚, given that aggregate advertising decreases with the proportionate
increase in marginal cost, the long-run price is increasing in this case.
The final comparative static is of transport cost on the equilibrium price. In this case, the
relationship is more complicated. On one hand, it was noted above that
푑푝
푑푡
= 1
2훼̂ 푚
− 푡
2(훼̂ 푚)2
(
휕[훼̂(푡, 푚)푚]
휕푚
푑푚
푑푡
+ 휕훼̂(푡, 푚)
휕푡
푚
)
. (B.15)
The first term is the direct effect from an increase of transportation cost on the price as is
positive. The second term is the indirect effect from transportation cost increasing. This
induces more entry, which we have seen increases aggregate advertising thereby reducing
the price, running counter to the direct effect. There is also the effect transportation costs
have directly on advertising levels, but we have seen that nets out to zero: the last term
(푑훼̂∕푑푡) was shown to be zero in Lemma 18. The other terms prove to be positive.
Lemma 22. The long run price is increasing in transportation cost.
Proof. Collecting the remaining terms we have
푑푝
푑푡
= 푡(푒
−훼 푚(2 + 훼 푚) − 2)2 − 2 푐′′(훼) 훼̂3푚2푡(푒−훼 푚(1 + 훼 푚) − 1))
(푒−훼 푚(2 + 훼 푚) − 2)[푡(푒−훼 푚(2 + 훼 푚) − 2) − 2푐훼̂3푚2]
> 0.
The inequality follows because as shown before both 푒−훼 푚(1+훼 푚)−1 and 푒−훼 푚(2+훼 푚)−2
are non-positive. 
All of the comparative statics here have the same sign as in Grossman and Shapiro (1984).
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